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ACCOMMODATING CAPITAL AND POLICING LABOR: 
ANTITRUST IN THE TWO GILDED AGES 
SANDEEP VAHEESAN* 
ABSTRACT 
 In enacting the antitrust laws, Congress sought to prevent big 
businesses from maintaining and augmenting their power through 
collusion, mergers, and exclusionary and predatory practices and 
also aimed to preserve the ability of workers to act in concert.  At 
times, the antitrust laws have benefited ordinary Americans.  Anti-
trust achievements include the restructuring of the oil industry in 
1911, the creation of competitive market structures in the mid-
twentieth century, and the termination of AT&T’s telecommunica-
tions monopoly in 1984. 
 Yet, the history of antitrust in the United States is not one of un-
interrupted successes.  Over two forty-year periods, the executive 
branch and federal courts, in enforcing and interpreting the anti-
trust laws, have failed to advance Congress’s vision and indeed 
inverted congressional intent.  During the original and current 
Gilded Ages, the antitrust laws were and are used to protect the 
power of large-scale business and also to limit the autonomy of 
workers to organize and demand higher wages and better working 
conditions.  Through this anti-labor application, the federal gov-
ernment has employed antitrust to aid big business, rather than 
restrain its power. 
 Despite this history of accommodating capital and policing la-
bor, the antitrust laws can still be reinterpreted and redeemed.  
Congressional, executive, and judicial action can remake these 
laws to control the power of large corporations and also protect 
the freedom of all workers to organize for higher wages and better 
working conditions.  A renewal of antitrust, in accordance with the 
expressed purposes of Congress, would help remedy the inequities 
of the New Gilded Age and create a more just society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
[A]s legislators we may constitutionally, properly, and wisely al-
low laborers to make associations, combinations, contracts, [and] 
agreements for the sake of maintaining and advancing their wages, 
in regard to which, as a rule, their contracts are to be made with 
large corporations who are themselves but an association or com-
bination or aggregation of capital on the other side.—Senator 
George Hoar1 
 
[H]istory shows that the victories won under [the Sherman Act] 
have been the suits against labor organizations, while great trusts 
and monopolies have grown and flourished.—Representative M. 
Clyde Kelly2 
 
The federal antitrust laws—the Sherman,3 Clayton,4 and Federal Trade 
Commission Acts5—have a complicated history.  The enforcement of these 
laws has produced some landmark successes and delivered important benefits 
to the public.  Federal antitrust enforcement restructured the oil refining in-
dustry in 1911,6 helped create decentralized market structures in the mid-
twentieth century,7 and ended AT&T’s stranglehold over the telecommuni-
cations industry in 1984.8  Yet, at other times, the federal antitrust agencies 
and courts, in enforcing and interpreting the antitrust laws, failed to advance 
Congress’s vision and indeed inverted its intent.  During the first forty years 
following the Sherman Act’s passage, and again over the past four decades, 
these laws were and have been generally applied and interpreted to structure 
markets to privilege monopolistic and oligopolistic businesses and to curtail 
the liberty of workers.9 
                                                          
 1.  21 CONG. REC. 2728 (1890). 
 2.  51 CONG. REC. 9087 (1914). 
 3.  Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
 4.  Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012). 
 5.  Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012). 
 6.  Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 7.  William G. Shepherd, Causes of Increased Competition in the U.S. Economy, 1939–1980, 
64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 613, 626 (1982). 
 8.  United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226–34 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d 
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
 9.  Contrary to libertarian and neoclassical accounts of a “free market” economy, state action 
is a precondition for markets and determines who has power and wealth in a society, most funda-
mentally, through the enforcement of property rights and contracts.  Those with a large holding of 
property, or, say, a monopoly on an essential form of property, wield a great deal of coercive power 
over others.  Those with little or no property have little or no coercive power.  The question is not 
whether the state acts or does not act, but to whose benefit it acts.  Warren J. Samuels, The Economy 
as a System of Power and Its Legal Bases: The Legal Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 261, 305–07 (1973).  The Supreme Court has in the past recognized the fact that state action 
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In enacting the principal antitrust laws, Congress aimed to check the 
power of large-scale capital and protect concerted labor action from federal 
interference.  The framers of the antitrust laws understood corporate power 
broadly.  Congress passed the antitrust laws to protect consumers and pro-
ducers from powerful corporate sellers and buyers, maintain markets open to 
all comers, and defend the American political system against corporate cap-
ture.10  At the same time, they did not want these new laws to be employed 
against collectives of workers.  The legislative histories of both the Sherman 
and the Clayton Acts indicate that Congress intended these statutes to control 
the power of capital, not labor.11  Indeed, a common view in Congress was 
that the antitrust laws and labor unions would serve complementary functions 
and together limit the power of monopolies and trusts.12 
During the decades following the passage of the Sherman Act, overlap-
ping with the original Gilded Age,13 the government failed to control the 
                                                          
controls the scope of property rights and enables contract law.  In a 1971 decision holding that 
welfare recipients were entitled to due process before loss of benefits, the Court noted that welfare 
benefits could be considered a form of property and that “[m]uch of the existing wealth in this 
country takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional common-law concepts of prop-
erty.”  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970).  Earlier, in finding the enforcement of 
racially restrictive covenants in housing to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court 
wrote,  
These are cases in which the States have made available to such individuals the full co-
ercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the 
enjoyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing and financially 
able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell.   
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948). 
 10.  John J. Flynn, The Reagan Administration’s Antitrust Policy, “Original Intent” and the 
Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 304–05 (1988); Rudolph J. 
Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 314–15 (1991). 
 11.  Louis B. Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: I, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1287 
n.14 (1939). 
 12.  For instance, one member of Congress called for “counter combinations among the people” 
to challenge the power of large corporations.  21 CONG. REC. 2565 (1890) (statement of Sen. Stew-
art). 
 13.  The Gilded Age is conventionally thought to have ended around the turn of the twentieth 
century with the rise of the Populist and Progressive movements.  The historical evidence suggests, 
however, that the New Deal era lasting from the 1930s through the 1970s was a “long exception” 
or an “interregnum between Gilded Ages.”  Jefferson Cowie & Nick Salvatore, The Long Exception: 
Rethinking the Place of the New Deal in American History, 74 INT’L LABOR & WORKING-CLASS 
HIST. 3, 5 (2008); Paul Krugman, Introducing This Blog, N.Y. TIMES: THE CONSCIENCE OF A 
LIBERAL (Sept. 18, 2007, 11:45 PM), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/09/18/introducing-
this-blog/; see also Sarah Jones, Lessons from the Gilded Age, NEW REPUBLIC (June 13, 2018), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/149005/lessons-gilded-age (“America is in a new Gilded Age, or so 
the headlines say.  ‘It’s Beginning to Look a Lot Like the Gilded Age,’ Bloomberg warned in Feb-
ruary, noting that the late nineteenth century ‘was a time of exploding economic inequality, stagnant 
living standards, growing concern about monopolies, devastating financial crises . . . brazen politi-
cal corruption, frequent pronouncements that the American republic was doomed, and seemingly 
unending turmoil over race and national identity.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Justin Fox, It’s 
Beginning to Look a Lot Like the Gilded Age, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/opinion/articles/2018-02-07/it-s-beginning-to-look-a-lot-like-the-gilded-age)). 
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growth of monopolies and oligopolies and instead used the antitrust laws to 
limit the activities of labor unions.  Although the United States Supreme 
Court established strict rules against price fixing,14 it limited the ability of the 
government to challenge corporate mergers.15  This combination of a prohi-
bition on price fixing and a tolerance of consolidation contributed to the first 
wave of mergers in American history.16  Instead of helping move the United 
States toward a less concentrated industrial structure, the antitrust laws ac-
celerated the rise of monopolies and oligopolies.  Although the administra-
tions of Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson 
launched a vigorous anti-monopoly campaign, these efforts, at most, undid 
only a part of the consolidation that resulted from the merger mania between 
1897 and 1904.  During this same time, even as the Supreme Court permitted 
economy-wide consolidation, it applied the antitrust laws to restrict the ac-
tivities of labor unions.17  The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the federal 
courts used the antitrust laws to discipline workers and to limit the ability of 
unions to apply pressure against hostile employers through secondary boy-
cotts and strikes.18  In the words of economic historian Richard White, the 
Sherman Act was “aimed at capital but hit labor.”19 
Breaking with the mid-twentieth century approach to antitrust, the fed-
eral courts and antitrust enforcers, since the late 1970s, have once again in-
terpreted—indeed reinterpreted—antitrust law to expand the autonomy of big 
capital and restrict the freedom of workers.  The executive branch and judi-
ciary have minimized concerns about the power of corporations.  They have 
replaced congressional (and once-judicially validated) economic and politi-
cal objectives with an “efficiency” or “consumer welfare”20 goal.  In the area 
of mergers, the Court has taken a generally hands-off approach, meaning that 
                                                          
 14.  United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v. Joint 
Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
 15.  United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
 16.  “The years following the Knight decision [one of the first significant cases tried under the 
Sherman Act] witnessed the greatest consolidation movement in the nation’s history, and most states 
proved economically impotent against the new, giant corporations operating in national and even 
world markets.”  NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN 
BUSINESS, 1895–1904, at 166 (1985). 
 17.  Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). 
 18.  See infra Section II.B. 
 19.  RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED: THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA 384 (2011). 
 20.  See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed the 
Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX 66 (1978))); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 1 (2010) (“Regardless of how enhanced market power likely would be manifested, 
the Agencies normally evaluate mergers based on their impact on customers.”).  Although the dis-
tinction between consumer welfare and economic efficiency is not important to the thesis of this 
Article, a review of the case law shows that consumer welfare is the goal of contemporary law.  John 
B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not 
Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 192 (2008). 
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the federal antitrust agencies have become the principal policymakers and 
used their power to handicap their own ability to stop mergers. 21  Except for 
horizontal mergers in highly concentrated markets that threaten to leave a 
market with four or fewer players, the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (“FTC”) today generally do not stop or even remedy most horizontal 
mergers.22  This lax approach to mergers has yielded multiple waves of con-
solidation across the economy and contributed to a highly concentrated in-
dustrial structure.  Along with the agencies’ permissive approach to mergers, 
the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of anti-monopoly law and re-
stricted the ability of plaintiffs to challenge predatory pricing23 and refusals 
to deal.24  The federal antitrust agencies have done little to resist this doctrinal 
retrenchment and have not brought a significant anti-monopoly case arguably 
since the lawsuit against Microsoft in 1998.25 
This general deference toward large businesses has been paired with 
vigilance toward collective action by labor.  The federal antitrust agencies, 
especially the FTC, repeatedly challenged union-like organization by work-
ers and professionals.  The FTC also consistently called on states to scale 
back occupational licensing rules that can help consumers and workers.  With 
this pro-capital, anti-labor orientation, the antitrust laws in the new Gilded 
Age resemble antitrust in the original Gilded Age.26  Laws intended to chal-
lenge the privileges of monopoly and preserve space for workers to organize 
are once again being used to preserve the existing power structure and under-
mine attempts by labor to strike a more equitable bargain with capital.27 
Through congressional, executive, and judicial action, the antitrust laws 
can be reinterpreted to honor their original legislative intent and to create a 
more just and equitable society.  This reinterpretation and revival of antitrust 
law would neither be easy nor be immediate.  It would require new legislation 
and a radical change in personnel both at the federal antitrust agencies and 
on the federal bench and the erasure of decades of accumulated pro-monop-
                                                          
 21.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, § 4 (“The measurement 
of market shares and market concentration is not an end in itself, but is useful to the extent it illu-
minates the merger’s likely competitive effects.”). 
 22.  John Kwoka, The Structural Presumption and the Safe Harbor in Merger Review: False 
Positives or Unwarranted Concerns?, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 837, 855 (2017). 
 23.  Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 224 (1993). 
 24.  Verizon Commc’ns. Inc. v.  Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 
(2004). 
 25.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Files Antitrust Suit against Microsoft 
for Unlawfully Monopolizing Computer Software Markets (May 18, 1998), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/1998/1764.htm. 
 26.  See infra Part IV. 
 27.  Frank Pasquale, When Antitrust Becomes Pro-Trust: The Digital Deformation of U.S. Com-
petition Policy, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., May 2017, at 4–5. 
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oly and pro-oligopoly precedent.  Yet, the conservative coup against the his-
torical understanding of the antitrust laws beginning in the 1970s28 reveals 
the malleability of these statutes.  At a minimum, the antitrust agencies and 
courts should reorient the antitrust laws to advance the congressional intent 
expressed in the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts.  The Congresses that 
passed these statutes sought to limit the power of large-scale capital over 
consumers and producers, competitors, and citizens and, at the same time, 
were near-unanimous in stating that these laws should not interfere with the 
joint action of workers.  The federal antitrust agencies and the courts should 
rediscover these legislative histories.  In this current era of deep economic 
and political inequality, the policy objectives expressed by Congress in 1890 
and 1914 remain as important as ever to ordinary Americans.  Persisting with 
the current antitrust paradigm would only uphold an unjust and increasingly 
unpopular status quo. 
Part I will lay out the legislative vision for the antitrust laws, showing 
that the framers of these statutes sought to control the power of large busi-
nesses29 and to protect the freedom of workers and their right of collective 
action.30  Part II will turn to administration and interpretation of the antitrust 
law from 1890 to the 1930s and examine how the executive branch and courts 
defanged the new laws against big business and weaponized it against work-
ers during this period.31  Part III will review antitrust over the past four dec-
ades—the Second Gilded Age—and describe the troubling pro-business,32 
anti-worker application and interpretation of the antitrust statutes over this 
period.33  Part IV will explain how antitrust law can still be remade in ac-
cordance with the original congressional vision and become a powerful in-
strument to create a more equitable society.34 
I.  THE ANTI-MONOPOLY, PRO-WORKER VISION UNDERLYING U.S. 
ANTITRUST LAW 
The Congresses that enacted the antitrust laws had an expansive vision 
to curtail the power of concentrated capital in American society.  These laws 
were passed against the backdrop of growing public fears about large corpo-
rations, which emerged in the new national market in the decades after the 
                                                          
 28.  The decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), was key 
in this transformation and retrenchment of antitrust law.  Id.; see also Eleanor M. Fox, The Mod-
ernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1152 (1981). 
 29.  See infra Section I.A. 
 30.  See infra Section I.B. 
 31.  See infra Sections II.A–B. 
 32.  See infra Section III.A. 
 33.  See infra Section III.B. 
 34.  See infra Sections IV.A–B. 
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Civil War.35  Americans recognized the totalizing power of these corporate 
titans.  They believed these new giants threatened ordinary Americans’ inter-
ests in their capacity as consumers, workers, farmers, entrepreneurs, and cit-
izens.36   
The legislative histories of the antitrust laws can and should inform their 
interpretation.  Despite the late Justice Scalia’s strident advocacy against the 
use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, courts, including the Su-
preme Court, continue to consult legislative history when interpreting ambig-
uously phrased statutes.37  Even under Justice Scalia’s philosophy of selec-
tively looking to the historical record for guidance,38 open-ended statutes 
such as the Sherman Act—more akin to broad constitutional provisions than 
to a detailed and precisely drafted federal statute39—arguably should be in-
terpreted in light of congressional purposes. 
A review of the legislative histories of the three principal antitrust stat-
utes reveals a broad understanding of corporate power.  Congress in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries recognized that this power mani-
fested itself in several ways.  The members of Congress who drafted the an-
titrust laws had a rich understanding of the power of monopoly and oligopoly 
and believed that such businesses exercised authority akin to private govern-
ments.40  Ohio Senator John Sherman described the trusts and monopolies as 
                                                          
 35.  James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitu-
tional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880–1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 283–84 (1989). 
 36.  See also WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST 
246–47, 334 (1991); HANS B. THORELLI, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN 
AMERICAN TRADITION 138–49 (1955); David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1226–28 (1987).  See generally LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE POPULIST 
MOMENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLT IN AMERICA (1978).  
 37.  David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of 
Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1739–40 (2010). 
 38.  Justice Scalia’s use of the debating and drafting record was not consistent.  He consulted 
and championed the use of these records in constitutional interpretation but denounced their use in 
statutory interpretation.  William N. Eskridge Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist 
but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1306–07 (1998). 
 39.  The key substantive provisions of the three main antitrust statutes are phrased in sweeping 
terms.  The Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade” and “monopoliz[ation] or attempt[s] to monopolize.” 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–2 (2012).  The FTC Act outlaws “[u]nfair methods of competition.”  Id. § 45.  The Clayton 
Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions whose effects “may be substantially to lessen competition, 
or to tend to create a monopoly.”  Id. § 18.  The Supreme Court once described the antitrust laws as 
“the Magna Carta of free enterprise.”  United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 
(1972); see also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933) (“As a 
charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to 
be desirable in constitutional provisions.”). 
 40.  K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 72 (2016). 
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exercising a “kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of govern-
ment.”41  More than fixating on a particular material effect of big business,42 
many leading members of Congress spoke out against these new corporate 
behemoths because they could, and did, exercise unaccountable power over 
Americans.43  Although prices were generally falling in the United States in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, members of Congress de-
nounced the power of corporations to raise prices above competitive levels 
and capture wealth from the consuming public.44  And for these Congresses, 
higher consumer prices were an important—but not the only—manifestation 
of monopoly and oligopoly power in the American political economy.  The 
drafters of the antitrust laws held that dominant and other powerful corpora-
tions threatened the freedom and viability of competitors and the preservation 
of democratic institutions. 
As Congress sought to curtail the power of large businesses, it aimed to 
preserve freedom of action for workers and their representative organiza-
tions.  Workers, unions, and their congressional supporters were concerned 
that the antitrust laws would be used against collective action by labor.  The 
legislative history of the Sherman Act suggests a congressional desire to ex-
empt labor from the new law’s ambit.  After a series of court decisions hostile 
to workers, Congress enacted an express exemption for labor in the Clayton 
Act.  This exemption states that “labor of a human being is not a commodity 
or article of commerce.”45  The legislative history of the Sherman Act indi-
cates that many members of Congress viewed labor organizing not as a target 
of antitrust enforcement but as a complement to antitrust enforcement—both 
essential to controlling the power of big businesses. 
A.  Curtail the Power of Concentrated Capital 
In passing the three principal antitrust statutes, the respective Con-
gresses expressed deep concerns about the power of concentrated capital.  
The legislative histories of the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts reveal an 
expansive understanding of corporate power.  The members of the Con-
                                                          
 41.  21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890). 
 42.  Notably, the economics profession was either indifferent toward or opposed to the passage 
of an antitrust law.  THORELLI, supra note 36, at 120–21.  
 43.  Senator Edmunds stated that, notwithstanding the possible material benefits of some trusts, 
these concentrations of power would “come to be tyrannies, grinding tyrannies, that have sometimes 
in other countries produced riots, just riots in the moral sense.”  21 CONG. REC. 2726 (1890).  One 
member of Congress in the debates preceding the enactment of the Clayton Act captured this power 
succinctly.  While he conceded that the trusts could be operated for the public benefit, he character-
ized this view as naïve because unchecked private power “affords too great a temptation to frail 
humanity.”  51 CONG. REC. 9186 (1914) (statement of Rep. Helvering). 
 44.  Robert H Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern: The Efficiency 
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 101 (1982). 
 45.  15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012). 
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gresses that debated, drafted, and passed the antitrust statutes were not con-
cerned with just one aspect of corporate power.  Representatives and senators 
warned of the power of corporations to control American society in myriad 
ways.  The congressmen feared private autocracy threatened the interests of 
Americans as consumers, farmers, workers, business proprietors, and citi-
zens.46  The antitrust statutes were Congress’s efforts to protect ordinary 
Americans from the power of the new corporate giants that defined the polit-
ical economy of the United States. 
1.  Protect Consumers, Producers, and Consumers from the Power 
of Large Corporations 
As Robert Lande shows in painstaking detail, the members of Congress 
that drafted the three primary antitrust statutes condemned monopolies and 
trusts for capturing wealth from American consumers, farmers, and other pro-
ducers.47  The corporate giants of the day used their power to raise prices to 
consumers and depress prices paid to farmers and workers, impoverishing 
ordinary Americans.  In the debate leading up to the passage of the Sherman 
Act, Senator James George denounced the higher prices from monopoly as 
“extortion which makes the people poor.”48  The private taxes collected by 
monopolies and cartels were a moral outrage akin to robbery,49 not an aca-
demic concern about “deadweight loss[es]” for economists to contemplate in 
seclusion.50 
Large corporations’ power to depress prices to producers, especially 
farmers, was another recurring theme.  Representative Heard, for instance, 
stated that the corporate titans of the day have “stolen untold millions from 
the people.”51  Congressman Taylor recognized that the trusts exercised great 
power as both sellers and buyers and condemned the beef trust for “rob[bing] 
the farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the other.”52  For Congress-
man Bland, the beef trust was a principal enemy of the farmer.  He asserted 
that “there is no trust in this country that today is robbing the farmers of the 
great West and Northwest of more millions of their hard-earned money than 
this so-called Big Four beef trust of Chicago.”53  This congressional interest 
in the impact of trusts on farmers is not surprising. Farmers, acting collec-
tively through organizations such as the Farmers’ Alliance, were among the 
                                                          
 46.  See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 10, at 304–05; Peritz, supra note 10, at, 314–15. 
 47.  Lande, supra note 44, at 82–142. 
 48.  21 CONG. REC. 1768 (1890). 
 49.  Id. at 2614 (statement of Rep. Coke). 
 50.  Christopher Grandy, Original Intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act: A Re-Examination of 
the Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 359, 373 (1993). 
 51.  21 CONG. REC. 4101 (1890). 
 52.  Id. at 4098. 
 53.  Id. at 4099. 
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leading supporters of anti-monopoly legislation in the late nineteenth cen-
tury.54 
In the debates in 1914 in the run-up to the passage of the FTC and Clay-
ton Acts, the theme of corporate theft from consumers and producers was 
once again at the forefront.  The principal Senate sponsor of the FTC Act 
expressed concern about “unreasonable and extortionate prices.”55  Another 
Senator stated that monopolies and trusts “mulct the people out of hundreds 
of millions of dollars each year”56 and characterized monopoly and oligopoly 
pricing as robbery.57  One Congressman sought to “secure the people from 
unjust tribute levied by monopolistic corporations.”58  In the debates preced-
ing the enactment of the Clayton Act, Senators Cummins and Thompson 
spoke of “protecting the people against the rapacity and the avarice of mo-
nopoly”59 and the “extortion practiced by the trust,”60 respectively.  Repre-
sentative Morgan endorsed the creation of the FTC because it would limit 
corporate “power to arbitrarily control prices and thus exact unjust profits 
from the people.”61 
Just as they were concerned with protecting consumers and producers 
from the power of the trusts, the Congresses that enacted the antitrust statutes 
were committed to protecting small businesses and other competitors from 
the power of large-scale capital.  Senator Sherman declared, “It is the right 
of every man to work, labor, and produce in any lawful vocation and to 
transport his production on equal terms and conditions and under like cir-
cumstances.”62  He deemed this right to be “industrial liberty” and the foun-
dation of equality in American society.63  Senator George held that, without 
congressional action, capitalist power would “at some not very distant 
day . . . crush out all small men, all small capitalists, all small enterprises.”64  
He rhetorically asked: “Is production, is trade, to be taken away from the 
great mass of the people and concentrated in the hands of a few men . . . ?”65  
Representative Mason went further than most of his colleagues and argued 
that preserving opportunities for small businesses should receive precedence 
                                                          
 54.  CRONON, supra note 36, at 343; Gary D. Libecap, The Rise of the Chicago Packers and 
the Origins of Meat Inspection and Antitrust, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 242, 256 (1992). 
 55.  Federal Trade Commission: Hearing on S.B. 2941 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Com-
merce, 62d Cong. 25 (1914) (statement of Sen. Newan, S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce). 
 56.  51 CONG. REC. 13223 (1914). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 8854. 
 59.  Id. at 14256. 
 60.  Id. at 14223. 
 61.  Id. at 9265. 
 62.  21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 2598. 
 65.  Id. 
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over consumer interests.66  He believed the theoretical efficiencies of large-
scale enterprise could come at too high a price: 
 Some say that the trusts have made products cheaper, have re-
duced prices; but if the price of oil, for instance, were reduced to 1 
cent a barrel it would not right the wrong done to the people of this 
country by the “trusts” which have destroyed legitimate competi-
tion and driven honest men from legitimate business enterprises.67 
When they debated the FTC and Clayton Act nearly a quarter-century 
later, members of Congress once again took an interest in the protection of 
competitive opportunities for small enterprises.  For Senator Reed, an objec-
tive of the FTC Act was to “keep the highways of opportunity unob-
structed . . . so that all may have a fair chance to gain a livelihood and to 
embark in business.”68  A Senate colleague aimed to preserve open and equal 
market opportunities for all participants.69  Senator Lane described the exis-
tential threat of large enterprises to small businesses, stating that without 
comprehensive federal legislation “every small and honorable dealer may be 
put to intentional and infinite annoyance or driven out of business by his 
larger or more crafty rival.”70  Senator Cummins, albeit expressing somewhat 
contradictory sentiments, wanted to preserve the domain of “individual initi-
ative” against “the power of the corporation.”71  Policing unfair practices in 
the marketplace was another important theme.  Congressman Stevens spoke 
for the need to protect “healthful competition”72 from threatening business 
practices.  Sounding a similar note, Senator Newlands condemned market 
practices “against public morals” that inflicted harm on competitors.73  An-
other Senator held that “oppression or advantage obtained by deception or 
questionable means is the distinguishing characteristic of ‘unfair competi-
tion.’”74 
The debates culminating in the passage of the Clayton Act also featured 
the preservation of opportunities for all comers.  The protection of small busi-
ness from overweening private power was an expressed goal.  Representative 
Nelson lamented the disappearance of small business in a wave of consolida-
tion.75  A House colleague condemned large enterprises’ quest for “industrial 
domination.”76  In endorsing the 1950 amendments to the Clayton Act (also 
                                                          
 66.  Lande, supra note 44, at 102. 
 67.  21 CONG. REC. 4100 (1890). 
 68.  51 CONG. REC. 13231 (1914). 
 69.  Id. at 14791–92 (statement of Sen. Burton). 
 70.  Id. at 13223. 
 71.  Id. at 12742. 
 72.  Id. at 14937. 
 73.  Id. at 11112. 
 74.  Lande, supra note 44, at 110 n.171 (quoting 51 CONG. REC. 12248 (1914)). 
 75.  51 CONG. REC. 9167 (1914). 
 76.  Id. at 9086. 
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known as the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act),77 Congressman Bennett 
stated that it would “preserve the chances of the average man to make a place 
for himself in business.”78 
2.  Preventing Capitalist Takeover of Political Institutions 
While coercion in the marketplace was an animating theme in the legis-
lative debates, the Congresses that passed the antitrust laws viewed concen-
trated corporate power as a threat to the American political system itself.  Pri-
vate capture and even displacement of government is an important theme in 
the legislative debates leading up to the passage of the landmark antitrust 
statutes.  The representatives and senators debating and drafting the bills sig-
naled the threat of private dictatorship.  They spoke of the threat to demo-
cratic institutions in American society and even warned of corporate autoc-
racy. 
Corporate control of political decisions was an important theme in the 
debate over the Sherman Act.  The specter of corporate capture of the state 
loomed large.  Senator Hoar deemed the monopolies of the late nineteenth 
century to be “a menace to republican institutions themselves.”79  In light of 
the power of these new corporate behemoths to control state governments, a 
Senate colleague called for a strong federal check on this private power.80  
Senator Sherman went even further and described the possibility of monop-
olies and trusts assuming control of key public decisions and displacing gov-
ernment.  He did not mince words on the connection between private power 
and dictatorship.  He explicitly stated, “If we would not submit to an em-
peror[,] we should not submit to an autocrat of trade.”81  Identifying the cap-
ital of private autocracy, he asked his Senate colleagues to “consider . . . 
whether, on the whole, it is safe in this country to leave the production of 
property, the transportation of our whole country, to depend upon the will of 
a few men sitting at their council board in the city of New York.”82  A col-
league echoed the profound threat to the public of a few individuals making 
decisions that affected the entire nation.83 
                                                          
 77.  Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (2012)). 
 78.  95 CONG. REC. 11506 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Bennett). 
 79.  21 CONG. REC. 3146 (1890). 
 80.  See id. at 2460 (“These combinations already defy or control powerful transportation cor-
porations and reach State authorities.  They reach out their Briarean arms to every part of our coun-
try.  They are imported from abroad.  Congress alone can deal with them, and if we are unwilling 
or unable there will soon be a trust for every production and a master to fix the price for every 
necessity of life.”).  
 81.  Id. at 2457. 
 82.  Id. at 2570. 
 83.  Id. at 2598 (statement of Sen. George). 
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As with the debates over the Sherman Act, the theme of private assump-
tion of governmental powers was central in the debates over the FTC and 
Clayton Acts.  Echoing Senator Sherman’s comments from a quarter-century 
earlier, Senator Cummins warned that material benefits of large-scale enter-
prise would come at too great a price “if it involves the surrender of the indi-
vidual, the subjugation of a great mass of people to a single master mind.”84  
In endorsing the FTC Act, Congressman Stevens stated that the growth of 
trusts and monopolies had created among Americans “a very just apprehen-
sion that this wealth, and power growing out of it, may be not only used to 
the detriment but also may be a potential source of injury and oppression.”85  
Deeming the Sherman Act to be a failure, Senator Newlands contended that 
corporate giants were so embedded in the American political economy that 
few dared to challenge their prerogatives.86  Senator Kenyon posed the choice 
before his colleagues starkly as between government taming private monop-
oly or private monopoly taking over the government.87 
The congressional discussion over the Clayton Act also revealed grave 
worries about private usurpation of government authority and featured espe-
cially evocative and rich rhetoric.  Representative Kelly spoke of monopoly 
as “the invisible government which has controlled the visible Government in 
this Nation for many years.”88  The Congressman additionally denounced the 
monopolies’ capture of government and their conversion of democratic insti-
tutions into servants of big capital: 
Great combinations of capital for many years have flaunted their 
power in the face of the citizenship, they have forced their corrupt 
way into politics and government, they have dictated the making 
of laws or scorned the laws they did not like, they have prevented 
the free and just administration of law.  In doing this they have 
become a menace to free institutions, and must be dealt with in 
patriotic spirit, without fear or favor.89 
Representative Nelson even offered a conservative case for the Clayton 
Act’s anti-merger provision, presenting the choice as one between decentral-
ized markets or eventual public ownership of corporations.  If the trend to-
ward monopoly continued, Nelson stated the people would select “public 
ownership of trusts for the benefit of all” over “the private ownership of the 
trusts for the privilege of the few.”90  For Nelson, this would be “the final 
                                                          
 84.  51 CONG. REC. 12742 (1914). 
 85.  Id. at 8850. 
 86.  S. REP. NO. 62-1326, at 19 (1914) (“[W]e find that the trusts are more powerful to-day than 
when the antitrust act was passed, and that evils have grown up so interwoven with the general 
business of the country as to make men tremble at the consequence of their disruption.”).  
 87.  51 CONG. REC. 13158 (1914). 
 88.  Id. at 9087. 
 89.  Id. at 9086. 
 90.  Id. at 9167. 
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triumph of socialism in this country.”91  For Senator Borah, capitalist control 
of the state would trigger a powerful reaction and culminate in political and 
social chaos.  Without a new antitrust law to fill major gaps in the Sherman 
Act and to impose real checks on the power of monopolies and trusts, he 
painted a Hobbesian future in which unlimited business power would “divide 
our people into classes, breed discontent and hatred, and in the end riot, 
bloodshed, and French revolutions.”92 
When the Clayton Act was amended in 1950,93 representatives and sen-
ators stressed the connection between concentrated industrial structures and 
the rise of totalitarianism.94  They believed that decentralization was critical 
to protecting democracy in the United States and toward that end strength-
ened the Clayton Act’s anti-merger provision.95  Several members of Con-
gress argued that economic autocracy and political autocracy were intimately 
intertwined.96  Congressman Celler drew a causal chain from the rise of the 
trusts in Germany to Hitler’s ascension to power and ultimately to World War 
II.97 
B.  Protect Workers’ Ability to Undertake Collective Action 
The Congresses that debated the Sherman and Clayton Acts sought to 
preserve freedom for workers and farmers to engage in collective action.  In 
enacting the antitrust laws, the legislative focus was on limiting the power of 
big business, not interfering with the freedom of workers to organize to raise 
wages and improve their working conditions.  The members of Congress who 
drafted the Sherman and Clayton Acts took pains to ensure these new laws 
would police capital and accommodate labor.  For many members of Con-
gress, the new federal antitrust laws and labor organizing were two methods 
                                                          
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 15955. 
 93.  See supra note 77 and accompanying text.  
 94.  Lande, supra note 44, at 137–38. 
 95.  See, e.g., 96 CONG. REC. 16452 (1950) (remarks of Sen. Kefauver) (“I am not an alarmist, 
but the history of what has taken place in other nations where mergers and concentrations have 
placed economic control in the hands of a very few people is too clear to pass over easily.  A point 
is eventually reached, and we are rapidly reaching that point in this country, where the public steps 
in to take over when concentration and monopoly gain too much power.  The taking over by the 
public through its government always follows one or two methods and has one or two political 
results.  It either results in a Fascist state or the nationalization of industries and thereafter a Socialist 
or Communist state.”).  
 96.  Id. at 16446 (remarks of Sen. O’Mahoney); id. at 16503–04 (remarks of Sen. Aiken). 
 97.  95 CONG. REC. 11486 (1949). 
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by which to protect millions of ordinary Americans against the power of con-
centrated capital.98  In the words of one Senator, “counter combinations 
among the people” were necessary to control the trusts.99 
In the lead-up to the passage of the Sherman Act, several members of 
Congress feared that the new law would be applied against organizations that 
represented workers and farmers.  The first draft of the bill that would be-
come the Sherman Act prohibited “all arrangements, trusts, or combinations 
between such citizens or corporations, made with a view or which tend to 
advance the cost to the consumer of any such articles.”100  Labor unions (and 
agricultural cooperatives) employed collective action to raise workers’ wages 
and farmers’ incomes and thereby could sometimes raise prices for consum-
ers.101  Under Senator Sherman’s original bill, the federal government and 
other plaintiffs could challenge collectives of workers.102 
                                                          
 98.  For example, Senator Teller in the debate over the Sherman Act wanted to control trusts 
and also preserve for “the laborers of the country the opportunity to combine either for the purpose 
of putting up the price of their labor or securing to themselves a better position in the world.”  21 
CONG. REC. 2561 (1890).  Senator Hoar said,  
[A]s legislators we may constitutionally, properly, and wisely allow laborers to make 
associations, combinations, contracts, agreements for the sake of maintaining and ad-
vancing their wages, in regard to which, as a rule, their contracts are to be made with 
large corporations who are themselves but an association or combination or aggregation 
of capital on the other side. 
Id. at 2728.  He contrasted combinations of works with combinations of capital that “extort from 
the community, monopolize, segregate, and apply to individual use, for the purposes of individual 
greed.”  Id.  Senator Edmunds, who did not support an exemption for labor, nonetheless said,  
[I]f capital and plants and manufacturing industries organize to regulate and so to repress 
and diminish, if you please, below what it ought to be, the price of all the labor every-
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Id. at 2727.  For more context, see Louis B. Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: I, 39 
COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1287 n.14 (1939). 
 99.  21 CONG. REC. 2565 (statement of Sen. Stewart).  This idea is what John Kenneth Galbraith 
later described as “countervailing power” against existing concentrations of power in the economy.  
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING 
POWER 110–14 (1952). 
 100.  21 CONG. REC. at 2455. 
 101.  During the debates preceding the passage of the Sherman Act,  
Senator Edmunds expressed the view that if a law was to be passed condemning all agree-
ments or combinations which tended to raise the price of commodities, neither labor nor 
farmer organizations ought to be excluded, since the raising of wages and the raising of 
prices of farm products by agreement or combination tended as much to raise the prices 
of commodities as did similar agreements or combinations of any other class. 
Boudin, supra note 98, at 1289. 
 102.  William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887–1890, 23 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 221, 250 (1956). 
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Although Senator Sherman insisted that his bill would not affect the ac-
tivities of labor unions,103 many of his colleagues were not assuaged by his 
assurances.  They feared that absent an exemption the bill would apply to 
labor organizations.  The senators who spoke on this issue overwhelmingly 
opposed applying the antitrust laws to labor collectives.104  Senator Hoar dis-
tinguished between collectives of labor and collectives of capital (corpora-
tions, including trusts and monopolies).  He deemed the former to be “lawful, 
wise, and profitable, [and] absolutely essential to the existence of the com-
monwealth itself,” and the latter as instruments of “purposes of individual 
greed.”105  Senator Edmunds, the one member who opposed the exemption, 
argued that the bill would deconcentrate markets and establish parity between 
capital and labor.106  In Senator Edmunds’ future world of equality between 
labor and capital, unions would be unnecessary.107  In light of the widely held 
concern that labor would be targeted, Senator Sherman introduced an exemp-
tion for farm and labor organizations to address his colleagues’ concerns.108 
When reviewing the bill with the farm and labor exemption and other 
amendments, the Senate Judiciary Committee adopted another bill entirely.  
This new bill made no mention of higher consumer prices and instead pro-
hibited restraints of trade.109  It also did not include any express exemption 
for labor unions and agricultural cooperatives.110  Yet, the critics of Senator 
Sherman’s earlier bill did not voice any concerns that this bill could be inter-
preted to restrict the collective actions of workers.111  These champions of 
labor, including Senator Hoar, supported the new bill and helped shepherd it 
through the Senate and enact the Sherman Act.112 
                                                          
 103.  Senator Sherman stated that “combinations of workingmen to promote their interest, pro-
mote their welfare, and increase their pay . . . are not affected in the slightest degree, nor can they 
be included in the words or intent of the bill.”  21 CONG. REC. 2562 (1890). 
 104.  Boudin, supra note 98, at 1287 n.14. 
 105.  21 CONG. REC. 2728 (1890). 
 106.  Boudin, supra note 98, at 1287 n.14. 
 107.  See id. (“In the course of the debate every senator who spoke on the subject, with the ex-
ception of Senator Edmunds, expressed himself as opposed to the application of the proposed law 
to labor unions or farmers’ organizations, and expressed the belief that the entire Senate concurred 
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 108.  21 CONG. REC. 2611–12 (1890); see also Joseph L. Greenslade, Labor Unions and the 
Sherman Act: Rethinking Labor’s Nonstatutory Exemption, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 151, 155–56 
(1988). 
 109.  See Greenslade, supra note 108, at 160 (“[T]he Judiciary Committee’s bill focused on con-
duct that restrained trade.”). 
 110.  Boudin, supra note 98, at 1287 n.14. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Greenslade, supra note 108, at 158–59. 
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While evidently not the view of some scholars,113 the most logical in-
terpretation of the Sherman Act’s legislative history is that Congress did not 
intend the law to reach the activities of labor unions and agricultural cooper-
atives.114  Senator Sherman’s initial bill focused on joint activities between 
“citizens or corporations” that raised prices to consumers.115  This language 
provoked strong reactions from senators who wanted to protect labor and 
farmer organizations from antitrust attack.116  Once the bill’s language was 
revised and made no reference to consumer prices, however, the pro-labor 
senators no longer raised the threats to labor unions.117  Barring some unan-
ticipated and unrecorded change in their attitude toward unions, at least one 
of these senators would have presumably demanded an exemption for labor 
unions, as they had for the earlier bill, if they feared an antitrust threat to 
unions.  Instead, they supported the new bill without further amendment.118  
Many years later, Samuel Gompers, the President of the American Federation 
of Labor and admittedly not a neutral source, stated, “We know the Sherman 
law was intended by Congress to punish illegal trusts and not the labor un-
ions, for we had various conferences with members of Congress while the 
Sherman Act was pending, and remember clearly that such a determination 
was stated again and again.”119 
In 1914, Congress unambiguously voiced its views on the application 
of antitrust to labor unions by establishing an express exemption in the Clay-
ton Act.  Reacting to judicial application of the Sherman Act to the activities 
of labor unions,120 Congress sought to undo this court interpretation and re-
store workers’ full freedom to engage in collective action.  Section 6 of the 
Clayton Act is phrased in broad terms, declaring that “[t]he labor of a human 
being is not a commodity or article of commerce.”121  After a protracted 
struggle to pressure Congress to overturn the judiciary’s anti-labor interpre-
tation of the Sherman Act,122 organized labor and its supporters in Congress 
believed they had won a great victory, hailing the Clayton Act’s exemption 
for labor as its Magna Carta.123  The statute’s plain meaning does not legalize 
                                                          
 113.  Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880–1930, 66 TEX. L. REV. 
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all union activity but does withdraw all union activity, including secondary 
actions, from the purview of the antitrust laws.124 
The legislative history of the Clayton Act is full of denunciations of the 
federal courts for applying the Sherman Act to the activities of labor unions.  
This judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act was considered a perversion 
of the statute.  Representative Madden declared that the Senate that passed 
the Sherman Act “clearly and unequivocally stated that its provisions would 
not cover” labor unions.125  Senator Ashurst held that the courts, by resorting 
to “strained and harsh constructions,” overrode the intent of the framers of 
the Sherman Act to protect labor unions.126  Stressing that the Sherman Act 
was intended to control the power of large corporate enterprise, Senator Wil-
liams declared: 
A statute which was passed avowedly and without question to 
check the operation of the tyranny of the combined money power 
of the country as being a menace to free institutions was construed 
by the Federal judiciary so as to operate against the freedom and 
liberty of men engaged in hiring their labor.127 
Tracing the arc of American history in the nineteenth century, Congress-
man Buchanan condemned the Supreme Court for holding that labor is a 
“commodity or an article of commerce” in this country and undoing not only 
what Congress had intended but also what the Civil War had conclusively 
resolved.128 
II.  ANTITRUST DURING THE FIRST GILDED AGE: 1890–1930S 
Despite Congress’s intent to police capital and accommodate labor 
through the Sherman Act, the executive branch and the courts inverted this 
legislative purpose.  In the 1890s, the first decade of the Sherman Act, the 
Supreme Court made two critical choices: The proscription of price fixing 
and the acceptance of consolidation contributed to an unprecedented merger 
wave.  These two decisions transformed the structure of American industry 
between 1896 and 1904.  This tolerance of mergers was accompanied by ex-
ecutive and judicial hostility toward collective action by workers.  Most of 
the early Sherman Act prosecutions targeted labor rather than business.  The 
Supreme Court interpreted the Sherman Act to proscribe secondary boycotts 
and strikes by workers and continued to follow this interpretation even after 
                                                          
 124.  Louis B. Boudin, Organized Labor and the Clayton Act: Part II, 29 VA. L. REV. 395, 410 
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Congress established an antitrust exemption for labor unions.  Multiple pres-
idential administrations and federal courts warped a law intended to tame the 
power of capital, converting it to tame the power of labor and create a more 
pliant workforce to the benefit of capital. 
A.  A Failure to Check the Growth of Trusts 
In a series of decisions, the early judicial interpretation of the antitrust 
laws produced a major dichotomy.  First, the Court held in the 1895 decision 
United States v. E.C. Knight Co.129 that Congress did not have the constitu-
tional authority to restrict mergers in manufacturing and mining and so the 
Sherman Act could not be used to challenge mergers in these sectors.130  In 
establishing a distinction between interstate commerce (which Congress 
could regulate) and production (which Congress could not regulate),131 the 
Court crippled the ability of the government to stop or undo anticompetitive 
mergers using the Sherman Act.132  Second, the Supreme Court, in a trio of 
decisions between 1897 and 1899, adopted a strict ban on overt price fixing 
between competitors.133  The Court refused to entertain defenses to horizontal 
price fixing or consider the “reasonableness” of the collusive prices.134  It 
established a per se ban on the practice that persists to this day.135 
These judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act encouraged busi-
nesses to grow and achieve monopoly and oligopoly through mergers.136  
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Corporations that previously sought to stabilize market prices through collu-
sion abandoned this strategy.  Under the judiciary’s reading of the Sherman 
Act, competitors that organized pools (a common price-fixing arrangement 
that did not involve the integration of business operations) would violate the 
Sherman Act.137  The E.C. Knight decision, however, granted businesses 
broad freedom to merge with competitors.138  Instead of price fixing, many 
firms tried to achieve market stabilization through mergers with, and acqui-
sitions of, rivals.139  At least outside of sectors that directly involved interstate 
commerce as the concept was then interpreted by the courts (such as rail-
roads), businesses could merge with some confidence that these consolida-
tions would be beyond the reach of the Sherman Act.140  The Court blocked 
one channel (price fixing) by which businesses could obtain market power 
but opened the flood gates on another channel (mergers) by which businesses 
could achieve a similar end.  Indeed, mergers, by bringing different busi-
nesses under common control, are a more potent method of raising and sta-
bilizing prices than collusive arrangements, which can be susceptible to 
cheating by participants.141 
In a cruel irony to the congressional framers and public supporters of 
the Sherman Act, the first fifteen years of this new law intended to curb the 
power of trusts and monopolies witnessed the emergence of concentrated 
markets across the economy.  In the late 1890s and early 1900s, the United 
States saw its first major merger wave, with hundreds of firms merging with 
their rivals.142 In 1899 alone, 1208 mergers occurred in the manufacturing 
                                                          
and most states proved economically impotent against the new, giant corporations oper-
ating in national and even world markets. 
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and mining sectors.143  Just two years earlier, in 1897, only sixty-nine mer-
gers had occurred in these two fields.144  Writing in 1901, two prominent 
economists, with a touch of hyperbole, described the nature of the change in 
the political economic landscape of the country: “If the carboniferous age had 
returned and the earth had repeopled itself with dinosaurs, the change made 
in animal life would have scarcely seemed greater than that which has been 
made in the business world by these monster-like corporations.”145 
Congress’s attempt to control mergers through the Clayton Act in 1914 
proved unsuccessful.  The new law had a major limitation.146  It prohibited 
acquisitions of corporate stock that could be anticompetitive but permitted 
asset acquisitions with similar effects.147  On top of this legislative “asset 
loophole,” the Supreme Court added a judicial gloss that further handicapped 
the government’s power to enforce anti-merger law.  In FTC v. Western Meat 
Co.,148 the Court held the government could not undo a stock acquisition after 
the acquiring company had assumed ownership of the acquiree’s physical 
assets.149  This neutered anti-merger law predictably failed to control the cor-
porate consolidation movement.  In the 1920s, the number of mergers in man-
ufacturing and mining annually never fell below 200 and hit a high of 1245, 
exceeding the earlier annual high of 1208 in 1899.150  And in many years 
between 1914 and 1950, the federal antitrust agencies, including the newly 
created FTC, did not bring suit to stop a single merger.151 
                                                          
 143.  Reid, supra note 132, at 27. 
 144.  Id. 
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This early era, however, did see some major victories on the monopoly 
front.  Given the creation of monopolies in a number of key industries, the 
public clamored for government action.152  The administrations of Theodore 
Roosevelt and especially of William Howard Taft and of Woodrow Wilson 
initiated a number of major monopolization suits.153  Targets of these cases 
included American Tobacco, International Harvester, Standard Oil, Swift, 
and U.S. Steel.154  In Standard Oil Co. v. United States155 and United States 
v. American Tobacco,156 the Supreme Court ordered the breakup of the mo-
nopolist in oil refining and the oligopolists in tobacco into smaller entities.157  
This anti-monopoly campaign continued through 1920 when legal and polit-
ical changes brought it to an end. The Supreme Court held in United States 
v. United States Steel Co.,158 that the steel giant’s growth through a series of 
acquisitions did not violate the Sherman Act in the absence of particular acts 
that excluded rivals.159  And with the election of conservative Republican 
President Warren Harding in 1920, the government showed little interest in 
anti-monopoly and antitrust enforcement in general.160 
Notwithstanding the significant government monopolization victories 
between 1904 and 1920, the merger wave had an enduring impact on the in-
dustrial structure of the United States.  A number of today’s corporate giants 
emerged during this period.  General Electric was the product of eight firms 
with a combined market share of ninety percent, Du Pont of sixty-four firms 
with approximately seventy percent of the market, and U.S. Steel of 180 
firms with sixty-five to eighty percent market share.161  The economist Jesse 
Markham, in a measured 1950 study, found that the effects of the turn of the 
century merger wave were still clear decades later.162  He concluded that the 
merger wave between 1896 and 1904 “left an imprint on the structure of the 
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American economy that fifty years have not yet erased.”163  Ralph Nelson 
went further and wrote that the merger wave at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury “laid the foundation for the industrial structure that has characterized 
most of American industry in the twentieth century.”164 
B.  Frustration of Collective Action by Workers 
Despite the pro-labor statements in the legislative history of the Sher-
man Act, the DOJ and the courts interpreted the new antitrust law to reach 
and limit collective action by workers.  Almost as soon as the Sherman Act 
became the law of the land, it was used against workers.  Over the first four 
decades of the new antitrust statute, the Supreme Court used the Sherman Act 
to deprive workers of two powerful organizing tools: the secondary boycott 
and strike.165  Through these secondary actions, labor could apply pressure 
on anti-union employers and organize an entire industry.166  Unless an entire 
industry was organized, union employers would face higher labor costs and 
remain at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis non-union rivals.167  Even af-
ter Congress enacted the statutory labor exemption in the Clayton Act, the 
Court continued to apply the Sherman Act against secondary action. 
The anti-labor potential of the Sherman Act became clear in its early 
years.  Between 1890 and 1897, a majority of successful prosecutions tar-
geted labor rather than capital.168  In the second case brought under the Sher-
man Act, the government targeted the workers who participated in the general 
strike in New Orleans in 1892, which originated in a dispute between long-
shoremen and their employers.169  The government characterized the strike 
as a “gigantic and widespread combination of the members of a multitude of 
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separate organizations for the purpose of restraining the commerce among 
the several states and with foreign countries.”170  The District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana held that the Sherman Act applied to “combi-
nations of labor, as well as of capital.”171  Although the strike had ended by 
the time the court heard the case, it granted the government’s request for in-
junctive relief and enjoined similar labor action in the future.172 
The most famous use of the Sherman Act against labor in the early years 
was against the nationwide railroad strikes stemming from the labor dispute 
between the Pullman Company, a monopoly in the manufacture of sleeping 
cars, and its employees.173  Workers at the Pullman company town in Illinois, 
where the eponymous luxury sleeping cars were manufactured, went on 
strike over a reduction in their wages.174  Rail workers across the country 
staged a secondary strike, with the aim of pressuring their employers to stop 
hauling Pullman cars.175  Even as many state and local officials across the 
country adopted a laissez-faire posture and declined to interfere in the dispute 
between workers and railroads unless violence occurred, the DOJ, headed by 
a corporate attorney who had counseled railroads, intervened on the side of 
capital.176  The government brought an action against the workers, using the 
Sherman and Interstate Commerce Acts, to end the Pullman strike.177  The 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government and against the striking 
workers and union leaders, relying on the general commerce clause powers 
of the federal government rather than the Sherman Act, to reach its hold-
ing.178 
The Supreme Court made its first major pronouncement on the Sherman 
Act and labor in 1908.179  In Loewe v. Lawlor,180 the Court decided whether 
the Sherman Act prohibited secondary boycotts undertaken as part of a cam-
paign to organize workers at a hat manufacturer in Connecticut.181  The 
Court, quoting a common law treatise on trade unions, stated that “every per-
son has individually, and the public also has collectively, a right to require 
that the course of trade should be kept free from unreasonable obstruction.”182  
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After reviewing the legislative history of the Sherman Act, the Court con-
cluded that attempts to exempt labor and farmer organizations from the bill 
had failed, and thereby labor activities that affected interstate commerce were 
subject to the Sherman Act.183  Because the union-instigated secondary boy-
cotts and strikes had “restrain[ed] and destroy[ed] interstate trade and com-
merce”184 of the manufacturer, the Court held that the union and its members 
could be held liable under the Sherman Act.185  Affirming this ruling in Gom-
pers v. Buck Stove & Range Co.,186 the Court wrote: “[T]he principle an-
nounced by the court [in Loewe] was general.  It covered any illegal means 
by which interstate commerce is restrained, whether by unlawful combina-
tions of capital, or unlawful combinations of labor . . . .”187 
Even after Congress enacted an express exemption for labor in the Clay-
ton Act,188 the Supreme Court continued to apply the Sherman Act to restrain 
the freedom of labor organizations.  The Court in Duplex Printing Press Co. 
v. Deering189 construed the Clayton Act’s labor exemption narrowly.  Ac-
cording to the majority, the Clayton Act restricted the federal judiciary’s eq-
uity power only over the employees directly involved in a labor dispute,190 
not over secondary boycotts and strikes.  The Court stated that Congress 
sought to give legal protection to “particular industrial controversies, not a 
general class war.”191  For the Court, the secondary action entailed “a threat 
to inflict damage upon the immediate employer, between whom and his em-
ployees no dispute exists, in order to bring him against his will into a con-
certed plan to inflict damage upon another employer who is in dispute with 
his employees.”192  Prosecutions of labor activities also continued apace and 
actually increased after Congress enacted the exemption for labor.  Nearly 
eighty percent of the antitrust cases against labor between 1890 and 1929 
were brought after the passage of the Clayton Act and its labor exemption in 
1914.193 
Although strikes could impede interstate commerce, the Court held in 
United Leather Workers International Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk 
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Co.194 that this is “an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce.”195  
The Court concluded that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to reach 
primary labor disputes that incidentally restrained interstate commerce.196  A 
few years earlier, the Court had indeed stated that unions were essential for 
the welfare of workers in a capitalist society.197 
Nonetheless, some courts even outlawed primary strikes and picketing 
under the Sherman Act.  In the wake of Herkert & Meisel, the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers of America198 prohibited primary strikes under the Sher-
man Act, drawing on common law precedent that prohibited third parties 
from inducing workers to leave their jobs.199  The judge found that the strikes 
in nonunionized textile mills in Philadelphia were intended to help princi-
pally unionized mills in New York City, and that aiding workers in Philadel-
phia was “at best a secondary and remote” motive.200  On this basis, the judge 
concluded the strike was an improper restraint of commerce and illegal under 
the Sherman Act.201  Under the rationale of the decision, workers arguably 
could not organize any new firm or region of the country: unionizing new 
workplaces would reduce or eliminate wage disparities across firms and 
thereby benefit already unionized workers and firms in an industry.  At least 
two courts held that the Clayton Act’s labor exemption provided no protec-
tion for labor unions and ruled that any collective labor activity that restrained 
interstate commerce violated the Sherman Act.202 
The courts’ anti-labor interpretation of the antitrust laws, contrary to the 
wishes of Congress, reflected a broader trend in the Gilded Age in which the 
judiciary overrode state and local decisions concerning the rights of work-
ers.203  The courts issued sweeping injunctions against labor activities and 
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jailed union leaders and members for defying them, leading to the epithet 
“government by injunction.”204  The federal government did not adopt a lais-
sez-faire approach to the contest between labor and capital but instead em-
ployed its coercive power to aid the interests of capital.205  As Sven Beckert 
writes of New York’s nineteenth century capitalist class: 
Loudly proclaiming the need for “less government,” they simulta-
neously embraced greater state activism—ranging from the use of 
the military and policing power of the state to quell domestic dis-
sent to the restriction of such fundamental rights as the freedom of 
movement, by successfully advocating the passage of antitramping 
legislation in New York State.206 
State action against workers in the United States was exceptionally violent 
and succeeded in eroding the power of American labor.207 
III.  ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE: THE LATE 1970S TO THE 
PRESENT 
In the latter part of the twentieth century and early twenty-first century, 
the executive and judicial choices to embrace consumer welfare antitrust 
have restored the antitrust law of the first Gilded Age to a troubling degree.  
Over the forty-year period from the New Deal in the late 1930s until the 
1970s, the Court interpreted the antitrust laws to serve as a check on the 
power of capital.  In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the congressionally expressed values of competitively priced goods,208 
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autonomy for small businesses,209 and decentralization of economic 
power.210  Recognizing that powerful private entities exercise quasi-govern-
mental power, the Supreme Court imposed antitrust duties and restrictions on 
this corporate regulatory authority.211  During this era, antitrust law placed 
significant limits on the prerogatives of big business, especially in the areas 
of mergers212 and monopolistic conduct.213  At the same time, antitrust law 
carved out a large space for workers to act collectively,214 though this free-
dom granted to labor did not extend to workers outside of conventional em-
ployment arrangements.215 
Since the late 1970s, the federal courts, the DOJ, and the FTC, informed 
by former Solicitor General Robert Bork’s fallacious analysis of the legisla-
tive history of the Sherman Act,216 have reoriented antitrust law away from 
broad political economy and toward narrow microeconomics.217  They have 
renounced the congressional goals of the antitrust laws and held that the only 
appropriate objective is the promotion of economic efficiency or consumer 
welfare.218  In implementing this model of antitrust, the federal antitrust agen-
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cies and courts have adopted the desirability of corporate freedom as an arti-
cle of faith, influenced by hypotheses developed and promoted by thinkers 
associated with the University of Chicago.219  Built on “an oversimplified 
economics that often rests on unfounded or disproven assumptions,”220 anti-
trust law today views most types of business conduct as positive or neutral.  
Outside of express price fixing and market allocation with rivals, businesses 
have expansive autonomy to control and dominate markets. 
In contrast to the deference to accumulation and exercise of corporate 
power, antitrust proscribes collective action by workers who are classified as 
independent contractors, instead of employees, under federal law.  In a period 
of high inequality221 and precarity for millions of Americans,222 which has 
been dubbed the “new Gilded Age,”223 antitrust law increasingly resembles 
antitrust law in the original Gilded Age and reinforces—rather than reme-
dies—structural inequalities in American society.  Federal enforcers and the 
courts are once again using and interpreting antitrust law not to tame the 
power of capital, but to tame the power of workers for the benefit of capital.  
And as the fraction of workers not entitled to the antitrust exemption grows, 
antitrust enforcers can target an ever-larger segment of American labor. 
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GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. 
HOUSEHOLDS IN 2016, at 2 (2017) (“Forty-four percent of adults say they either could not cover an 
emergency expense costing $400, or would cover it by selling something or borrowing money, 
which has continued to improve from the 50 percent who were ill-prepared for this magnitude of 
expense when first asked in 2013.”). 
 223.  See Jefferson Cowie, America May Never Have Another New Deal, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 
15, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/131401/america-may-never-another-new-deal (“The re-
turn of nineteenth-century-style plutocracy, crony capitalism, and shocking levels of inequality—
disparities that continued even after the excitement of Obama’s presidency—suggest a conscious, 
confident, and powerful ruling class that has largely separated itself from the concerns of the na-
tion’s working people.”). 
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A.  Acceptance of Monopoly and Oligopoly 
The Supreme Court and the federal antitrust agencies have transformed 
antitrust and, in large measure, neutralized the ability of these laws to control 
corporate power.  The Supreme Court has generally stood aside on the issue 
of mergers.  Here, the federal antitrust agencies have become the principal 
policymakers and published merger guidelines that have become increasingly 
tolerant of corporate consolidation.  In the name of advancing the ahistorical 
goal of consumer welfare,224 the Supreme Court and lower courts have re-
written precedent on monopolization to favor large corporations.  The agen-
cies and courts still view horizontal price fixing and other forms of collusion 
between rivals with hostility and stress the need to police this “supreme evil 
of antitrust.”225  Yet even here the results are underwhelming.  An examina-
tion of the anti-collusion program reveals a campaign that inadequately deters 
price fixing, often treats large corporate colluders with leniency, and devotes 
resources to secondary or otherwise trivial matters. 
1.  Mostly Quiet on Mergers and Monopolies 
In the area of mergers, the federal antitrust agencies have, in large meas-
ure, displaced the courts as the principal makers of policy.  The Supreme 
Court last heard and decided a merger challenge on the merits more than forty 
years ago226 and has not formally overruled strict merger precedents from the 
1960s.227  The DOJ and FTC have published a series of guidelines on how 
they analyze horizontal mergers and when they are likely to challenge such 
mergers.228  Over time, the agencies have become increasingly tolerant of 
corporate consolidation because of a belief that mergers can produce produc-
tive efficiencies that benefit consumers and society.229  In the most recent 
                                                          
 224.  Among other deficiencies, the language of consumer welfare ignores how sellers were and 
still are entitled to antitrust protection from powerful buyers.  Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. 
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235–36 (1948); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood 
Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 320 (2007). 
 225.  Verizon Commc’ns. Inc. v.  Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 
(2004). 
 226.  United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974). 
 227.  See, e.g., Polypore Int’l Inc. v. FTC, 686 F.3d 1208, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e see no 
error resulting from the Commission’s application of the Philadelphia National presumption to find 
that Polypore had illegally acquired Microporous, thus substantially lessening competition.”).  In 
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the Supreme Court ruled that a 
horizontal merger that creates an entity with a market share of thirty percent is presumptively illegal.  
Id. at 364.  Some appellate courts, however, have held that the Philadelphia National Bank prece-
dent no longer carries the weight it once did.  E.g., United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 
981, 990–91 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 228.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1997); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
MERGER GUIDELINES (1982). 
 229.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, § 10 (“[A] primary 
benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies and thus 
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guidelines issued in 2010, the agencies moved further away from presump-
tions of illegality for mergers in concentrated markets.230  They embrace an 
analytical approach that calls for a showing of anticompetitive effects.231  In 
other words, the agencies have progressively restricted their own ability to 
stop mergers.  While not bound to adopt these guidelines, the courts have 
often given great weight to the agencies’ analytical framework.232 
In practice, the antitrust agencies today challenge only horizontal mer-
gers in highly concentrated markets.  The FTC’s merger record is revealing.  
Fifteen or twenty years ago, the FTC frequently challenged mergers that re-
duced the number of competitors in a market from eight to seven or seven to 
six.233  It, however, has rarely challenged these mergers in recent years, tak-
ing action only when a merger is poised to reduce the number of market par-
ticipants to four or fewer.234  And even when the FTC takes action against a 
merger, it often does not seek to challenge and stop the merger in court.235  In 
an effort to remedy the predicted harms of horizontal mergers in concentrated 
markets, both the FTC and the DOJ often permit these consolidations to pro-
ceed on the condition that the merging parties agree to divest assets in the 
market in which they compete head-to-head or agree to behavioral duties and 
restrictions.236  Remarkably, the agencies fail to enforce their own merger 
                                                          
enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, im-
proved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”).  But see Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, 
Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and Efficiency 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 22750, 2016), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22750.pdf (“[W]e find 
little evidence for plant- or firm-level productivity effects from [merger and acquisition] activity on 
average, nor for other efficiency gains often cited as possible from [merger and acquisition] activity, 
including reallocation of activity across plants or scale efficiencies in non-productive units of the 
firm.”). 
 230.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, § 4 (“The measurement 
of market shares and market concentration is not an end in itself, but is useful to the extent it illu-
minates the merger’s likely competitive effects.”). 
 231.  Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty 
Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 707–08, 721 (2010). 
 232.  See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying the Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines in a merger challenge).  Hillary Greene has carefully documented and 
analyzed the influence of the Merger Guidelines on judicial decision-making.  Hillary Greene, 
Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 771, 775 (2006). 
 233.  Kwoka, supra note 22, at 855. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  E.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Requires Fresenius Medical Care AG & 
KGaA and NxStage Medical, Inc. to Divest Bloodline Tubing Assets to B. Braun Medical, Inc. as 
a Condition of Merger (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/2019/02/ftc-requires-fresenius-medical-care-ag-kgaa-nxstage-medical-inc. 
 236.  See ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 142, at 196–99 (criticizing the agencies’ narrow analyt-
ical framework and “consultant” role in facilitating corporate consolidation). 
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guidelines, especially the concentration thresholds that should trigger pre-
sumptions of illegality.237 
The agencies have taken a hands-off approach to vertical mergers since 
the Clinton administration.238  On the rare occasions they are concerned with 
the competitive effects of a vertical consolidation, the DOJ and FTC gener-
ally do not seek to enjoin these deals in court.239  In 2010 and 2011, the DOJ 
permitted three large vertical mergers that had serious anticompetitive poten-
tial to proceed on the condition that the new vertically integrated companies 
agree to behavioral duties and restrictions.240  In one of these cases, the DOJ 
found that the merger had no offsetting consumer benefits and yet chose not 
to stop the consolidation in court.241 
Along with the agencies’ tolerance of corporate consolidation, the Su-
preme Court curtailed the reach of anti-monopoly law and granted expansive 
freedom to monopolies and other dominant businesses.  The Court has re-
peatedly cited concerns about deterring “pro-competitive” behavior (defined 
as conduct that advances a particular conception of economic efficiency) in 
limiting the ability of the government and other plaintiffs to challenge mo-
nopolies.242  The Supreme Court has neutered anti-monopoly doctrine in two 
areas in particular: predatory pricing and refusals to deal. 
The Court practically eliminated predatory pricing as a cause of action 
and granted large corporations the power to acquire and maintain market 
dominance through temporary below-cost pricing.  The Court initiated this 
                                                          
 237.  John Kwoka, Reviving Merger Control: A Comprehensive Plan for Reforming Policy and 
Practice 19–28 (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/10/Kwoka-Reviving-Merger-Control-October-2018.pdf. 
 238.  Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Revising the U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy 
Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1, 4 (2015).  The 
Trump administration’s attempt to stop AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner was the first time the 
government tried to block a vertical merger in court in nearly forty years.  United States v. AT&T 
Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 165 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Fruehauf Corp. 
v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 239.  See generally Salop & Culley, supra note 238, app. 
 240.  United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149–50 (D.D.C. 2011); United States 
v. Ticketmaster Entm’t, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00139, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88626 (D.D.C. July 30, 
2010). 
 241.  Competitive Impact Statement at 29–30, Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145 (No. 1:11-
cv-00106). 
 242.  See, e.g., Pac Bell. Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commuc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009) (“To 
avoid chilling aggressive price competition, we have carefully limited the circumstances under 
which plaintiffs can state a Sherman Act claim by alleging that prices are too low.”). 
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shift in a pair of decisions in the mid-1980s that cast doubt on whether pred-
atory pricing occurs.243  In one of these decisions, Matsushita Electric Indus-
tries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,244 the Court ignored the historical and em-
pirical record on predation245 and instead drew on simplistic theoretical 
literature, stating “that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even 
more rarely successful.”246  In addition to asserting that predatory pricing is 
not a real threat to competitive markets, the Court expressed a concern that 
the threat of predatory pricing lawsuits alone could discourage price dis-
counting.247 
Operating with these assumptions, the Court subsequently established a 
legal standard very favorable to actual and would-be predators.  To establish 
predatory pricing, a plaintiff (government or private) must first show the de-
fendant engaged in below-cost pricing and the defendant would likely recoup 
the upfront losses through higher prices in the future.248  The second prong, 
recoupment, imposes especially high burdens on plaintiffs.249  Under the re-
coupment requirement, plaintiffs have one of two options: either wait until 
the defendant has eliminated its rivals and preserved or acquired monopoly 
power or offer speculative stories on future recoupment to judges who have 
been directed to examine predatory pricing allegations with great skepti-
cism.250  In 2007, the Supreme Court, in a rare instance of looking at upstream 
effects, held that the restrictive two-part test announced in Brooke Group Ltd. 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.251 should apply to claims alleging 
predatory bidding practices in which monopsonies (single dominant buyers 
in a market) inflate purchase prices to weaken or eliminate rival buyers.252  
                                                          
 243.  Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119 n.15 (1986); Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986). 
 244.  475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 245.  Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of 
Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655, 715 (1982). 
 246.  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589. 
 247.  Id. at 594. 
 248.  Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 224 (1993). 
 249.  Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 
1720 (2013). 
 250.  See id. at 1760 (“The recoupment requirement creates false negatives, in part, because 
courts are not adept at predicting recoupment.  Reliance on recoupment leads courts to incorrectly 
conclude that predation has not taken place.  In the hands of judges unversed in the mechanics of 
competition and predation, recoupment presents an impossible-to-satisfy element in some court-
rooms.”). 
 251.  509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
 252.  Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 325–26 
(2007).  
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In addition to its general deficiencies, the Brooke Group test is especially ill-
suited for business with buyer-side power. 253 
Much as they have freedom to engage in predatory pricing, dominant 
firms have broad discretion to preserve their market power by refusing to 
grant access to essential assets to rivals.254  Over the past fifteen years, the 
Court has curtailed refusal-to-deal claims against monopolists.  In Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,255 the Court 
held that the respondent’s refusal-to-deal claim had to be resolved through 
the regulatory system, not antitrust litigation.256  While arguably a narrow 
holding confined to industries subject to public utility regulation, the Court’s 
decision limited the reach of an earlier decision that had upheld refusal-to-
deal liability for a dominant firm.257  The Court also adopted a Schumpeterian 
perspective258 in which monopoly—and the prospect of monopoly—is the 
lifeblood of a capitalist system.  It wrote that “[t]he opportunity to charge 
monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acu-
men’ in the first place.”259  This language flatly contradicts the legislative 
history of the Sherman Act.  Congress condemned monopoly for its economic 
and political effects and, contrary to Justice Scalia’s dictum, did not view it 
as the source of capitalism’s salvation.260 
Since Trinko, the Court appears to have only grown more hostile to re-
fusal-to-deal allegations.  In Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Commu-
nications, Inc.,261 the Court applied the reasoning of Trinko to dismiss a price 
squeeze claim against a regulated internet service provider.262  If anything, 
                                                          
 253.  Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror, 62 EMORY L.J. 1509, 1533 
(2013) (observing that buyers can wield tremendous power over sellers at market shares well below 
the conventional monopoly share threshold). 
 254.  See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610–11 (1985) 
(“Although Ski Co.’s pattern of conduct may not have been as ‘bold, relentless, and predatory’ as 
the publisher’s actions in Lorain Journal, the record in this case comfortably supports an inference 
that the monopolist made a deliberate effort to discourage its customers from doing business with 
its smaller rival.  The sale of its 3-area, 6-day ticket, particularly when it was discounted below the 
daily ticket price, deterred the ticket holders from skiing at Highlands.  The refusal to accept the 
Adventure Pack coupons in exchange for daily tickets was apparently motivated entirely by a deci-
sion to avoid providing any benefit to Highlands even though accepting the coupons would have 
entailed no cost to Ski Co. itself, would have provided it with immediate benefits, and would have 
satisfied its potential customers.  Thus the evidence supports an inference that Ski Co. was not 
motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer 
goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.” (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149 (1951))).  
 255.  540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 256.  Id. at 413–14. 
 257.  See id. at 409 (“Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability.”). 
 258.  JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 825 (1942). 
 259.  Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407. 
 260.  See supra Section I.A. 
 261.  555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
 262.  Id. at 457. 
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the Court today may be even more hostile to refusal-to-deal claims than it 
was in 2007.  As a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, Justice Neil Gorsuch, one of President Trump’s two additions to the 
Court,263 extended the logic of Trinko and held that refusal-to-deal claims 
would be recognized under only very exceptional circumstances.264 
Along with the Court’s retrenchment of monopoly law in two important 
areas, the federal antitrust agencies, in particular the DOJ, have scaled back 
their monopoly enforcement efforts.  The DOJ has practically suspended 
anti-monopoly enforcement over the past twenty years, filing just one pure 
monopoly case since 2000265 which settled.266  The DOJ’s most notable anti-
monopoly action during the Obama years may have been non-action through 
the closing of a lengthy investigation into Monsanto’s seed distribution prac-
tices267 and the decision against bringing a monopolization claim against Am-
azon over its e-book pricing strategy.268  As Chart 1 indicates, the DOJ’s ne-
glect of monopoly matters is not new, dating back to the early 1980s and 
being consistent across administrations except for a brief upsurge in investi-
gations in the 1990s. 
                                                          
 263.  Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Neil Gorsuch Is Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-
court.html?_r=0. 
 264.  Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1076 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that a plain-
tiff seeking to establish a refusal-to-deal claim must show that a monopolist “sacrifice[d] short-term 
profits”). 
 265.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION: WORKLOAD STATISTICS: FY 2008–2017, 
at 5 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
2008–2017 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS] ; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION: 
WORKLOAD STATISTICS: FY 2000–2009, at 6 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/pub-
lic/281484.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2000–2009 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD 
STATISTICS].  
 266.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Texas 
Hospital Prohibiting Anticompetitive Contracts with Health Insurers (Feb. 25, 2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-texas-hospital-prohibiting-
anticompetitive-contracts. 
 267.  Ian Berry & David Kesmodel, U.S. Closes Antitrust Investigation into Seed Industry, Mon-
santo, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424127887324735104578123631878019070; Tom Philpott, DOJ Mysteriously Quits 
Monsanto Antitrust Investigation, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.moth-
erjones.com/food/2012/12/dojs-monsantoseed-industry-investigation-ends-thud/. 
 268.  Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 756–62 (2017). 
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CHART 1: DOJ MONOPOLY INVESTIGATIONS INITIATED BY YEAR269 
 
 
Over the past decade, the FTC has filed cases against monopolists, with 
a focus on parties that engaged in anticompetitive exclusive dealing270 and 
abusive patent enforcement.271  Yet, many of these cases have involved mo-
nopolists of lesser consequence.272  And like the DOJ, the FTC’s most news-
worthy act on the monopolization front was arguably an act of omission.  In 
early 2013, the FTC rejected the recommendation of its legal staff and closed 
its two-year investigation into Google’s search practices with highly unusual 
“non-binding commitments” that did not include any enforceable condi-
tions.273 
Unfavorable precedent can explain only a part of the agencies’ lethargy 
in the monopolization realm.  Pro-defendant precedents such as Brooke 
Group and Trinko loom large.  Yet, these cases do not represent the entire 
universe of anti-monopoly law.  Monopoly precedent is not uniformly hostile 
to enforcers, in particular for exclusive dealing and loyalty rebate claims. 
                                                          
 269.  Division Operations, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2019). 
 270.  E.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Intel Corp., No. 9341, 
2010 F.T.C. LEXIS 82 (Oct. 29, 2010). 
 271.  E.g., In re Motorola Mobility LLC, No. C-4410, 2013 F.T.C. LEXIS 96 (July 23, 2013); 
In re Robert Bosch GmbH, No. C-4377, 2013 F.T.C. LEXIS 59 (Apr. 23, 2013). 
 272.  See, e.g., In re IDEXX Laboratories, Inc., No. C-4383, 2013 F.T.C. LEXIS 11, at *6 (Feb. 
11, 2013) (settling allegations that manufacturer of pet diagnostic products improperly required ex-
clusivity from distributors); In re Pool Corp., No. C-4345, 2012 F.T.C. LEXIS 8, at *8–9 (Jan. 10, 
2012) (settling allegations that distributor of pool products used exclusive dealing with manufactur-
ers to foreclose other distributors). 
 273.  In re Google Inc., No. 111-0163, 2013 F.T.C. LEXIS 2, at *22–24 (Jan. 3, 2013).  A memo 
drafted by the FTC’s Bureau of Competition recommended that the Commission sue Google for 
anticompetitive practices including search bias and impeded advertisers from working with rival 
search engines.  See Brody Mullins et al., Inside the U.S. Antitrust Probe of Google, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 19, 2015), www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-u-s-antitrust-probe-of-google-1426793274.  
Commissioner Rosch criticized his fellow commissioners for accepting a non-binding settlement.  
Google, 2013 F.T.C. LEXIS 2, at *22–23.  For a critical take on the FTC’s public explanation on 
why it chose not to sue Google, see generally Frank Pasquale, Paradoxes of Digital Antitrust: Why 
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Plaintiffs have achieved victories in court on monopolization claims,274 in-
cluding in a predatory pricing claim a decade after Brooke Group.275 
Instead of resisting the judicial retrenchment of anti-monopoly law, the 
federal antitrust agencies have on occasion supported expanding the auton-
omy of monopolists and other dominant firms.  During the George W. Bush 
administration, the DOJ and FTC filed several amicus briefs that called on 
the courts to weaken anti-monopoly precedent.276  For a time, the DOJ even 
served as Microsoft’s international advocate, criticizing anti-monopoly ac-
tions against the software company by the European Union277 and the Korean 
Fair Trade Commission.278  In the final months of the second term of George 
W. Bush’s presidency, the DOJ put out a report of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act that called for further retrenchment of anti-monopoly law.279  This report 
recommended relaxing existing Supreme Court anti-monopoly precedent, in-
cluding in the areas of exclusive dealing280 and predatory pricing281 and 
called for de facto legality for unilateral refusals-to-deal.282  A three-commis-
sioner majority at the FTC declined to join the report and issued a scathing 
repudiation of it.283  They described the report as “chiefly concerned with 
firms that enjoy monopoly or near-monopoly power, and prescrib[ing] a legal 
regime that places these firms’ interests ahead of the interests of consum-
ers.”284  To its credit, the Obama administration DOJ quickly withdrew this 
pro-monopoly report in 2009.285  Despite this ostensible philosophical shift, 
                                                          
 274.  E.g., McWane, 783 F.3d at 842; ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 303 (3d 
Cir. 2012); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 315 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 275.  Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 953 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 276.  E.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Pac. Bell Tel. 
Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009) (No. 07-512); Brief for United States & FTC 
Supporting Petitioner, Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398 (2004) (No. 02-682). 
 277.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Thomas O’ 
Barnett, Issues a Statement on European Microsoft Decision (Sept. 17, 2007), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/2007/226070.pdf. 
 278.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General J. 
Bruce McDonald Regarding Korean Fair Trade Commission’s Decision in Its Microsoft Case (Dec. 
7, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/2005/213562.pdf. 
 279.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER 
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008), https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf. 
 280.  Id. at 140. 
 281.  Id. at 73. 
 282.  Id. at 129. 
 283.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Commissioners Harbour, Leibowitz and 
Rosch on the Issuance of the Section 2 Report by the Department of Justice (Sept. 8, 2008), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-commissioners-react-depart-
ment-justice-report-competition-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-under/080908section2stmt.pdf. 
 284.  Id. at 1. 
 285.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Mo-
nopoly Law (May 11, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-withdraws-report-
antitrust-monopoly-law. 
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the DOJ’s actual monopoly enforcement record represented continuity from 
the Bush years.286 
2.  The Underwhelming Campaign Against Corporate Collusion 
The Supreme Court and the federal agencies continue to treat (overt) 
collusion, which the Court has described as the “supreme evil of antitrust,”287 
as a serious antitrust offense.  Price fixing and other forms of horizontal col-
lusion remain per se illegal.288  The antitrust agencies prioritize the prosecu-
tion of collusion.289  The DOJ views the criminal prosecution of cartels and 
cartel participants as the core of its antitrust mission.290  For cartel activity, 
the DOJ collected corporate fines of $985 million in 2015 and $450 million 
in 2016.291  In those two years, the DOJ had twelve and twenty-two individ-
uals, respectively, sentenced to prison.292  The DOJ has sent a number of 
managers and executives to prison for their involvement in the auto parts293 
                                                          
 286.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2008–2017 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 265, 
at 5. 
 287.  Verizon Commc’ns. Inc. v.  Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 
(2004).  This is an empirically suspect assertion even from a consumer welfare perspective.  Maurice 
E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 505–09. 
 288.  Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1998).  Even for collusion-like con-
duct though, the courts do not consistently apply the per se rule or even a strong presumption of 
illegality.  See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 156 (2013) (holding that an agreement 
between branded and generic drug makers that resembles market allocation should be analyzed un-
der the rule of reason); California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1139 (9th Cir. 
2011) (concluding that a revenue sharing agreement between competing supermarkets should be 
evaluated under the rule of reason). 
 289.  Consider the DOJ’s workload numbers from 2016.  The DOJ initiated twenty-three grand 
jury investigations and filed fifty-one criminal cases.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2008–2017 
ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 265, at 4.  Because only collusion is subject to 
criminal enforcement today, all these cases presumably involved collusion.  In contrast, the DOJ 
filed fifteen merger challenges and zero monopoly complaints.  Id. at 4–5.  The numbers from 2007 
during the George W. Bush administration reflect a similar breakdown, albeit with fewer merger 
challenges.  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2000–2009 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS, 
supra note 265. 
 290.  E.g., Bill Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Prosecuting Antitrust 
Crimes, Remarks as Prepared for the Georgetown University Law Center Global Antitrust Enforce-
ment Symposium (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517741/download; Thomas O. 
Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Perspectives on Cartel Enforcement 
in the United States and Brazil, Address at the Universidade de São Paolo (Apr. 28, 2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/519601/download. 
 291.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2008–2017 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 265, 
at 11. 
 292.  Id. at 12. 
 293.  Nick Bunkley, Japanese Auto Suppliers Are Fined, and Executives Agree to Prison, in a 
Price-Fixing Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/business/jap-
anese-auto-suppliers-fined-in-us-price-fixing-case.html. 
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and liquid crystal display294 cartels and indicted the late Aubrey McClendon, 
the CEO of Chesapeake Energy, over collusion in the acquisition of natural 
gas leases.295 
Notwithstanding the rhetorical commitment and headline numbers, the 
anti-collusion enforcement program is still far from satisfactory.296  When 
they target collusion, the agencies often impose inadequate penalties on of-
fending corporations and individuals.  The prison sentences are short com-
pared to those for offenses inflicting much less harm on the public,297 and the 
fines are often a small fraction of the offenders’ annual revenues and prof-
its.298  John Connor and Robert Lande found that the overall cartel enforce-
ment program, including both government prosecutions and private lawsuits, 
fails to adequately deter collusion.299  Their research shows that private dam-
ages and public penalties are “only 9% to 21% as large as it should be to 
protect potential victims of cartelization optimally.”300  From the perspective 
of optimal deterrence, in the area of cartels, “[corporate] crime pays”301 and 
                                                          
 294.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Au Optronics Corporation Executive Sentenced for Role 
in LCD Price-Fixing Conspiracy (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/au-optronics-cor-
poration-executive-sentenced-role-lcd-price-fixing-conspiracy. 
 295.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former CEO Indicted for Masterminding Conspiracy Not 
to Compete for Oil and Natural Gas Leases (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-
ceo-indicted-masterminding-conspiracy-not-compete-oil-and-natural-gas-leases. 
 296.  A basic contradiction lies at the heart of public antitrust enforcement in the United States.  
The federal antitrust agencies have permitted markets to become much more concentrated.  In highly 
concentrated markets, oligopolistic firms recognize their mutual interdependence and often collude 
tacitly to maximize collective profits over time.  The antitrust laws cannot effectively police this 
type of tacit collusion or coordination.  The antitrust agencies, through their feeble merger enforce-
ment policy, have allowed markets to become much more vulnerable to collusion.  While allowing 
the creation of market structures conducive to collusion, the agencies continue to emphasize prose-
cutions of explicit collusion between rivals.  Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilem-
mas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 
ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 161 (1993). 
 297.  The average prison term for an individual antitrust violator sentenced in 2016 was under 
one year and never higher than 923 days (less than three years) in each year since 2007.  U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, 2008–2017 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 265, at 12.  These sen-
tences are mild compared to the often-draconian sentences imposed on ordinary Americans, espe-
cially on poor people of color.  See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). 
 298.  Consider the successful prosecution of the lysine cartel that ran from 1992 to 1995.  ADM, 
a principal conspirator, had net sales of $12.7 billion in 1995 alone.  John M. Connor, The Global 
Lysine Price-Fixing Conspiracy of 1992–1995, 19 REV. AGRIC. ECON. 412, 413 (1997).  ADM pled 
guilty and paid a $70 million fine to DOJ for its involvement, and all the participants paid a civil 
settlement of $66 million.  John M. Connor, “Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel 
of 1992–1995, 18 REV. INDUS. ORG. 5, 14, 20 (2001).  In short, ADM paid a small fraction of one 
year’s revenues for its involvement in a multi-year criminal conspiracy. 
 299.  John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, 
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 430 (2012). 
 300.  Id. at 430. 
 301.  Id. at 479. 
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“the ‘cluster bombs’ that constitute the current anti-cartel sanctions have been 
duds.” 302 
The DOJ’s cartel enforcement program has often taken a relatively le-
nient approach toward large corporations.  Consider the DOJ’s enforcement 
efforts against collusion in financial markets.  In a series of cases targeting 
collusion in the municipal bond market and the setting of the London Inter-
bank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”), the DOJ frequently entered into deferred or 
non-prosecution agreements with the banks instead of pursuing indict-
ments.303  Under these agreements, corporate defendants avoid prosecution 
typically on the condition that they pay a fine, improve internal compliance 
processes, and agree not to repeat the illegal acts in the future.304  Highlight-
ing the inadequate deterrence value of these agreements, the DOJ found in 
2015 that two banks breached earlier deferred prosecution agreements and 
engaged in collusion.305 
This leniency seems to extend to collusion by large actors in non-finan-
cial sectors.  For instance, the DOJ declined to criminally prosecute several 
leading Silicon Valley executives for conspiring not to recruit each other’s 
employees and thereby suppressing the wages of software engineers and 
other professionals in the tech sector.306  The late Steve Jobs, the principal 
instigator of the conspiracy, threatened to instigate patent litigation and other 
                                                          
 302.  Id. 
 303.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, UBS AG Admits to Anticompetitive Conduct by For-
mer Employees in the Municipal Bond Investments Market and Agrees to Pay $160 Million to 
Federal and State Agencies (May 4, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ubs-ag-admits-anticom-
petitive-conduct-former-employees-municipal-bond-investments-market-and; Press Release, U.S. 
Department of Justice, JPMorgan Chase Admits to Anticompetitive Conduct by Former Employees 
in the Municipal Bond Investments Market and Agrees to Pay $228 Million to Federal and State 
Agencies (July 7, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jpmorgan-chase-admits-anticompetitive-
conduct-former-employees-municipal-bond-investments; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Deutsche Bank’s London Subsidiary Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Ma-
nipulation of LIBOR (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deutsche-banks-london-sub-
sidiary-agrees-plead-guilty-connection-long-running-manipulation; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Rabobank Admits Wrongdoing in Libor Investigation, Agrees to Pay $3225 Criminal Pen-
alty (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rabobank-admits-wrongdoing-libor-investiga-
tion-agrees-pay-325-million-criminal-penalty. 
 304.  PUB. CITIZEN, JUSTICE DEFERRED: THE USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION 
AGREEMENTS IN THE AGE OF “TOO BIG TO JAIL” 5 (2014), https://www.citizen.org/sites/de-
fault/files/justice-deferred-too-big-to-jail-report.pdf.  
 305.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas (May 
20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas.  For 
the history and ineffectiveness of corporate deferred and non-prosecution agreements, see 
BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS (2014). 
 306.  United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 10 cv 1629, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83756 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 18, 2011).  In October 2016, the DOJ and FTC put out guidance stating that this type of col-
lusion could be subject to criminal prosecution.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS (2016), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/atr/file/903511/download. 
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legal attacks on tech companies that did not abide by the “no-poaching” 
agreement for skilled professionals.307  Google fired a human resources offi-
cial who breached this agreement and sought to recruit an Apple employee.308  
Although this conspiracy was a per se violation, the DOJ held off on pursuing 
a criminal case and entered into a civil settlement with Apple, Google, and 
Intel, among others.309  This settlement required no admission of guilt from 
the companies and only mandated that they not engage in collusive wage 
suppression for a fixed period of time.310  Neither the government complaint 
nor the settlement named the individual wrongdoers, suggesting the DOJ was 
not even willing to shame Jobs and his fellow conspirators.311  It took a pri-
vate class action on behalf of workers hurt by the wage suppression pact to 
reveal the identities of the elite conspirators.312  In a recent case against a no-
poach agreement between two rail equipment manufacturers, the DOJ once 
again accepted a civil settlement.313  Along with this general leniency toward 
large businesses and their executives, the DOJ appears to be more forgiving 
toward companies that engage in comparatively sophisticated forms of col-
lusion-like restraints.314 
                                                          
 307.  Mark Ames, Revealed: Apple and Google’s Wage-Fixing Cartel Involved Dozens More 
Companies, Over One Million Employees, PANDO (Mar. 22, 2014), 
https://pando.com/2014/03/22/revealed-apple-and-googles-wage-fixing-cartel-involved-dozens-
more-companies-over-one-million-employees/.  Mark Ames, Steve Jobs Threatened Palm’s CEO, 
Plainly and Directly, Court Documents Reveal, PANDO (Feb. 19, 2014), 
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wouldnt-join-wage-fixing-cartel/ [hereinafter Ames, Steve Jobs Threatened]. 
 308.  Robert Faturechi, Apple, Google Agree to Settle Antitrust Class Action, Lawyer’s Office 
Says, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-apple-
google-agree-to-settle-antitrust-class-action-lawyers-office-says-20140424-story.html. 
 309.  Adobe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83756, at *4; Ames, Steve Jobs Threatened, supra note 307. 
 310.  Adobe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83756, at *1, 4–5, 12. 
 311.  Id. at *4. 
 312.  In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1111–12 (N.D. Cal. 2012); 
David Streitfeld, Engineers Allege Hiring Collusion in Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/technology/engineers-allege-hiring-collusion-in-silicon-val-
ley.html. 
 313.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Knorr and Wabtec to Termi-
nate Unlawful Agreements Not to Compete for Employees (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-knorr-and-wabtec-terminate-unlawful-agreements-
not-compete. 
 314.  Consider the KeySpan-Morgan Stanley matter.  In 2011, DOJ uncovered a collusive finan-
cial swap agreement between KeySpan, a large power generator in New York City, and a rival 
generator, using Morgan Stanley as an intermediary.  The DOJ did not pursue a criminal prosecution 
and instead settled the civil complaint by requiring KeySpan to disgorge less than twenty-five per-
cent of its estimated profits from the illegal conspiracy.  United States v. Keyspan Corp., 763 F. 
Supp. 2d 633, 636–27, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Comment 
Letter on Proposed Final Judgment in United States v. Keyspan Corp. 11 (Apr. 30, 2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f259700/259704-5.pdf (“KeySpan’s ill-gotten gains far exceeded 
the $12 million payment DOJ is seeking.  DOJ alleges the KeySpan Swap was effective from Jan-
uary 16, 2006 until March, 2008.  Under the swap agreement, if the market price for capacity ex-
ceeded $7.57 per kW-month, the financial services company . . . would pay KeySpan the difference 
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At the same time as it practices leniency with American corporate gi-
ants, the DOJ has brought a number of criminal actions against small-time 
price fixers.315  It successfully prosecuted a number of individuals for rigging 
the auctions for foreclosed homes in Alabama, California, and Georgia316 and 
obtained prison sentences and fines for conspirators.317  At these auctions, 
banks and other financial institutions sell foreclosed homes and recover the 
amount outstanding on the mortgage of the defaulting homeowners.318  The 
DOJ admitted the principal victims of this type of collusion are financial in-
stitutions and other investors, not distressed homeowners.319  In its anti-cartel 
activities in the financial sector, the DOJ conformed to a disappointing pat-
tern seen in other areas: treat banks that cheat the public gently, punish those 
who cheat the banks harshly.320 
The DOJ brought a number of other criminal cartel cases of dubious 
public value.  The DOJ targeted collusion in the obscure market for heir lo-
cation services, which “identify people who may be entitled to an inheritance 
from the estate of a relative who died without a will.”321  Over the past dec-
ade, other cartel cases involved ready-mix cement makers in Northern 
                                                          
between the market price and $7.57, times 1800 MW.” (footnote omitted) (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 9950 
(Mar. 4, 2010))  
 315.  Prosecuting Collusion and Fraud at Real Estate Foreclosure Auctions: Division Update 
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 317.  E.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Northern California Real Estate Investor Sentenced 
to Prison for Rigging Bids at Public Foreclosure Auctions (July 26, 2017), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/pr/northern-california-real-estate-investor-sentenced-prison-rigging-bids-public-fore-
closure. 
 318.  Division Update, supra note 315. 
 319.  See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Two Georgia Real Estate Investors Plead Guilty to 
Rigging Bids at Public Home Foreclosure Auctions (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/pr/two-georgia-real-estate-investors-plead-guilty-rigging-bids-public-home-foreclo-
sure-auctions (“[T]he purpose of the conspiracies was to suppress and restrain competition and di-
vert money to the conspirators that otherwise would have gone to pay off the mortgage and other 
holders of debt secured by the properties and, in some cases, the defaulting homeowner.”). 
 320.  DAVID DAYEN, CHAIN OF TITLE: HOW THREE ORDINARY AMERICANS UNCOVERED 
WALL STREET’S GREAT FORECLOSURE FRAUD 240 (2016); David Dayen, Big Bank Punishment 
Don’t Fit Their Crimes, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 22, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/big-bank-pun-
ishments-dont-fit-their-crimes. 
 321.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, First Charges Brought in Investigation of Collusion Among 
Heir Location Services Firms (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/first-charges-
brought-investigation-collusion-among-heir-location-services-firms. 
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Iowa,322 gasoline stations in a town in Oklahoma,323 online sellers of lanyards 
and wristbands,324 third-party retailers of wall posters on Amazon,325 and 
sellers of packaged ice in Cincinnati and Minneapolis.326 
While expressing the strongest condemnation of collusion, the Supreme 
Court weakened private enforcement and thereby helped undermine cartel 
deterrence efforts.327  Over the past forty years, the Court raised the proce-
dural barriers for private plaintiffs, in particular class action plaintiffs.328  The 
Court reinterpreted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to allow defendants 
to get cases dismissed more easily, whether at the pleadings329 or summary 
judgment stage.330  Along with rewriting pleading standards in a business-
friendly manner, the Court raised the burden for certifying classes331 and re-
                                                          
 322.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Iowa Company Pleads Guilty to Participating in Ready-
Mix Concrete Price-Fixing and Bid-Rigging Conspiracy (Aug. 24, 2011), https://www.jus-
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 326.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Cincinnati Packaged-Ice Manufacturer Sentenced to Pay 
$9 Million for Its Role in a Customer and Territory Allocation Conspiracy (Mar. 2, 2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/cincinnati-packaged-ice-manufacturer-sentenced-pay-9-million-
its-role-customer-and-territory; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Minneapolis Packaged-Ice Com-
pany Agrees to Plead Guilty to Customer Allocation Conspiracy (Oct. 13, 2009), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/pr/minneapolis-packaged-ice-company-agrees-plead-guilty-customer-allocation-con-
spiracy. 
 327.  See Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment 
of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269, 1272, 1285 (2013) (finding that 
private enforcement likely deters more anticompetitive behavior than the DOJ’s anti-cartel enforce-
ment activities). 
 328.  Jason Rathod & Sandeep Vaheesan, The Arc and Architecture of Private Enforcement Re-
gimes in the United States and Europe: A View Across the Atlantic, 14 U. N.H. L. REV. 303, 323–
37 (2016). 
 329.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (ruling that a plaintiff’s pleading 
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 330.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (granting 
summary judgment for defendants because there is no plausible motive for predatory price fixing); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986) (finding summary judgment for defend-
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322–23 (1986) (ruling that the non-movant must show there is a genuine dispute of material fact to 
avoid summary judgment). 
 331.  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 
US. 338, 349–50 (2011). 
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quired the enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses in nearly all in-
stances, including those that deprive injured parties of the right to litigate on 
a collective basis through class actions.332  Class actions are often the only 
means of seeking redress for illegal conduct, such as a price-fixing conspir-
acy, that inflicts small harm on a large number of individuals.333  In antitrust 
actions, the Court also limited consumer standing to direct purchasers, mean-
ing consumers more than one level removed from an antitrust violator cannot 
obtain damages under federal antitrust law.334 
B.  Workers in the Antitrust Crosshairs 
1.  Enforcement Actions Against Workers’ Collective Action 
Even as the courts and agencies relaxed antitrust doctrine concerning 
corporate mergers and monopolies and presided over dramatic increases in 
market concentration, they continue to police the collective action of work-
ers.  The agencies and courts mechanically apply the logic that horizontal 
coordination among independent economic actors is the “supreme evil of an-
titrust”335 and employed antitrust against the efforts of workers and other 
small players to build power through joint action.336  While the courts do 
recognize the statutory exemption in the Clayton Act for organized labor,337 
this exemption protects only workers who have, or are seeking, employee 
status.338  Given employers’ increasing classification—and misclassifica-
tion339—of workers as independent contractors across the economy,340 the 
                                                          
 332.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); AT&T Mobility 
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LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 969, 1032–33 (2016). 
 339.  See Danny Vinik, The Real Future of Work, POLITICO MAG., Jan.–Feb. 2018, 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/04/future-work-independent-contractors-alter-
native-work-arrangements-216212 (“[S]tate-level audits indicate that about 10 percent to 30 percent 
of American workers are currently misclassified.  There are also some indications that misclassifi-
cation is becoming more widespread.”). 
 340.  See Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Arrange-
ments in the United States, 1995–2015, at 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
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Clayton Act’s exemption for labor, as currently interpreted, provides many 
workers with no protection from antitrust investigations and lawsuits. 
The Supreme Court and lower courts held that workers who are not em-
ployees under the National Labor Relations Act341 can be liable for collusive 
conduct under the antitrust laws.  Consider the case FTC v. Superior Court 
Trial Lawyers Ass’n.342  A group of public defenders believed the District of 
Columbia underpaid them for their services and organized a boycott of the 
city’s public defender service.343  Through this boycott, the public defenders 
obtained an increase in their hourly rates from the city council.344  The FTC 
brought an enforcement action against the attorneys, alleging they engaged 
in a group boycott and price fixing, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.345  The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the FTC, holding that the public 
defenders committed a per se violation.346  While the lawyers’ action resem-
bled a strike, the Court did not even address whether the lawyers were pro-
tected by the Clayton Act’s labor exemption, likely because the lawyers were 
independent contractors.347 
While they appear to ignore labor market practices and structures that 
hurt workers,348 the federal antitrust agencies, especially the FTC, have made 
policing collusion between workers a priority.  The FTC brought a number 
                                                          
22667, 2016) (finding “that the percentage of workers engaged in alternative work arrangements—
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 347.  Marina Lao, Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for Extending the Antitrust Labor 
Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1563 (2018). 
 348.  See supra Section III.A (discussing DOJ’s slap on the wrist remedy against tech giants that 
colluded against workers); see also Suresh Naidu et al., Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 542 (2018) (“Relying, we suspect, on the traditional assumption of econo-
mists that labor markets are competitive, the agencies have never blocked a merger because of its 
effect on labor markets—or, even, as far as we know, given the labor market effects of a potential 
merger more than cursory attention.”); Rachel Abrams, Why Aren’t Paychecks Growing? A Burger-
Joint Clause Offers a Clue, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/09/27/business/pay-growth-fast-food-hiring.html (“Some of fast-food’s biggest 
names, including Burger King, Carl’s Jr., Pizza Hut and, until recently, McDonald’s, prohibited 
franchisees from hiring workers away from one another, preventing, for example, one Pizza Hut 
from hiring employees from another.”); José Azar et al.,  Labor Market Concentration 13 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24147, 2017) (“We find that higher labor market 
concentration is associated with significantly lower real wages.”). 
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of actions against professionals who undertook conduct that limited compe-
tition and downward pressure on incomes.  The FTC has gone after practices 
that resemble strike-like conduct.  In two actions, the FTC alleged that phy-
sicians groups in Modesto, California and Boulder, Colorado “refuse[d], and 
threaten[ed] to refuse, to deal with insurance providers, unless they raised the 
fees paid to the groups’ doctors.”349  Over the past few decades, the FTC 
brought numerous cases against doctors across the country who engaged in 
collective bargaining or similar activity with private and public payors.350  Of 
the seven cases the FTC has litigated before the Supreme Court since 1986, 
three involved dentists and another involved public defenders.351  While this 
figure does not necessarily reflect the agency’s overall enforcement activi-
ties, it calls for a critical examination of the agency’s priorities.  The DOJ 
brought multiple similar actions against medical professionals who acted in 
concert.352  To put this enforcement activity in perspective, the DOJ since the 
year 2000 filed more cases against chiropractors for collective bargaining 
than against monopolists for exclusionary conduct.353 
While doctors generally earn six-figure salaries and enjoy high status in 
the United States,354 they, like many other workers, often face powerful cor-
porate buyers for their services—namely private insurance companies—and 
typically possess little bargaining power as individual practitioners.355  Yet, 
the antitrust actions against doctors ignored the power of the insurers.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in affirming an FTC 
                                                          
 349.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settles Price-Fixing Charges Against Two Sepa-
rate Doctors’ Groups (Dec. 24, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/12/ftc-
settles-price-fixing-charges-against-two-separate-doctors. 
 350.  E.g., N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Santiago, 
155 F.T.C. 874 (2013); In re Higgins, 149 F.T.C. 1114 (2010); In re Conn. Chiropractic Ass’n, 145 
F.T.C. 163 (2008); In re Me. Health Alliance, 136 F.T.C. 616 (2003). 
 351.  The three cases involving dentists are North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 
135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015), California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999), and FTC v. Indiana 
Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).  The case concerning public defenders is FTC v. Su-
perior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
 352.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Idaho Orthopedists Charged with Engaging in Group 
Boycotts and Denying Medical Care to Injured Workers (May 28, 2010), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/pr/idaho-orthopedists-charged-engaging-group-boycotts-and-denying-medical-care-
injured-workers; United States v. Chiropractic Assocs., Ltd., No. CV 13-04030-LLP, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 141345 (D.S.D. Sept. 3, 2013); United States v. Okla. State Chiropractic Indep. Phy-
sicians Ass’n, No. 13-CV-21-TCK-TLW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90485 (N.D. Okla. May 21, 2013) 
 353.  Compare, e.g., Chiropractic Assocs., Ltd., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141345, and Okla. State 
Chiropractic Indep. Physicians Ass’n, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90485, with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
2008–2017 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 265, at 5, and .S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
2000–2009 ANTITRUST WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 265, at 6 (showing a total of one Sher-
man Act monopoly complaint filed in court from 2000 to 2017). 
 354.  Elisabeth Rosenthal, Medicine’s Top Earners Are Not the M.D.s, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/sunday-review/doctors-salaries-are-not-the-big-
cost.html. 
 355.  John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Healthcare Prices, 91 WASH. L. REV. 253, 284–85 
(2016). 
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order against a group of physicians in the Fort Worth area, showed this dis-
regard for buyer-side power.  The court did not consider whether the insurers 
had the capacity to depress payments to physicians and upheld the FTC’s 
decision, in part, because the physicians’ group “us[ed] collective bargaining 
power to demand higher fees for physicians who are already under contract 
with a payor.”356 
These antitrust enforcement activities against workers and small propri-
etors have not been restricted to medical professionals or other well-heeled 
professionals.  These actions run the gamut of occupations.  The FTC brought 
enforcement actions against animal breeders,357 electricians,358 ice skating 
teachers,359 managers of commercial and residential properties,360 music 
teachers,361 organists,362 and public defenders (again)363 for adopting codes 
of ethics that restrained direct competition in an effort to maintain or raise 
members’ incomes and promote a shared identity among members.364  FTC 
investigations sweep even more broadly than enforcement actions would sug-
gest.  For instance, the FTC investigated truck drivers at several ports for 
seeking to organize for higher wages, reduced hours, and improved working 
                                                          
 356.  N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 369 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 357.  In re Nat’l Ass’n of Animal Breeders, Inc., No. C-4558, 2015 F.T.C. LEXIS 267 (Nov. 2, 
2015). 
 358.  In re Prof’l Lighting & Sign Mgmt. Cos., Inc., 159 F.T.C. 261 (2015). 
 359.  In re Prof’l Skaters Ass’n, 159 F.T.C. 758 (2015). 
 360.  In re Nat’l Ass’n of Residential Prop. Managers, Inc., No. C-4490, 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 
217 (Oct. 1, 2014). 
 361.  In re Music Teachers Nat’l Ass’n, Inc., No. C-4448, 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 68 (Apr. 3, 2014); 
In re Nat’l Ass’n of Teachers of Singing, Inc., No. C-4491, 2014 F.T.C. LEXIS 218 (Oct. 1, 2014). 
 362.  In re Am. Guild of Organists, No. C-4617, 2017 F.T.C. LEXIS 76 (May 26, 2017). 
 363.  In re Lewis, 138 F.T.C. 213 (2004). 
 364.  Some of these occupations appear to provide very modest remuneration for workers.  See, 
e.g., William Peek, Comment on In re Am. Guild of Organists (May 2, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2017/05/00013-140686.pdf 
(“Church organists are often highly skilled, highly trained musicians.  A quick perusal of the church 
jobs listed on the AGO website reveals that the majority require a minimum of a Bachelor’s degree 
in music, and many require a Masters and more.  Yet that same perusal reveals that the salaries that 
are offered are very modest; most less than $20,000 per year.”).  And some of the challenged rules 
have social value in promoting occupational camaraderie and collective identity among members 
of the professional associations.  See, e.g., Paula Neihouse Moseman, Comment on Proposed Con-
sent Agreement In re Music Teachers Nat’l Ass’n, Inc. (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/pol-
icy/public-comments/comment-00233-5 (“The provision in the MTNA Code of Ethics is simply a 
statement to encourage teachers to maintain a high level of professionalism.  It is common courtesy 
to not actively try to steal another teacher’s students away from their studio.  It has absolutely noth-
ing to do with discouraging competition!  Private music teachers are always in demand and the 
consumer searching for a teacher makes their choice based on a number of factors.  If they don’t 
like one teacher, there are always many more available.”). 
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conditions.365  And private employers and purchasers of labor services can 
also use antitrust to discipline workers.366 
A January 2015 blog post revealed the FTC’s attitude toward concerted 
action by professionals.  In this post, an FTC official put professionals and 
other independent contractors on notice that the FTC would take action 
against them in the future for collective action that did not produce offsetting 
consumer benefits.367  This post elided any differences between large busi-
nesses and workers and stated they are both “subject to the same antitrust 
rules of the road,”368 in effect adopting the position that antitrust applies 
equally to “a combination of all the great industrial enterprises” and “a com-
bination of maidservants.”369 
The antitrust threat to labor today is arguably even greater than it was 
during the first Gilded Age.  A century ago, workers engaging in secondary 
actions to advance organizing campaigns violated federal antitrust law.  In 
general, however, workers could undertake primary actions to unionize a 
workplace.370  Today, however, professionals and other independent contrac-
tors cannot engage in primary action and face judicial condemnation for bar-
gaining collectively with purchasers of their services.371 
2.  Advocacy Against State and Local Policies That Can Help 
Workers 
Along with their enforcement activities, the agencies advocated against 
collective bargaining rights at the state and local level.  They wrote amicus 
briefs and comment letters urging state legislators not to grant collective bar-
gaining rights to medical professionals.372  In November 2017, the DOJ and 
                                                          
 365.  Paul, supra note 338, at 981. 
 366.  See, e.g., Michael Paulson, Theater Producers Accuse Casting Directors of Forming Ille-
gal Cartel, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/05/theater/producers-
lawsuit-casting-directors.html (“The producers and casting directors have been at odds for more 
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they say, to win health care and pension benefits.  They have sought representation from Teamsters 
Local 817, which already represents casting directors in film and television. . . .  The producers have 
argued that casting directors are independent contractors, not production employees, and therefore 
do not have the right to bargain collectively as a union.”). 
 367.  Geoffrey Green, Unflattering Resemblance, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 13, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/01/unflattering-resemblance. 
 368.  Id. 
 369.  Int’l Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, 213 (1914). 
 370.  United Leather Workers, 265 U.S. 457, 471 (1924). 
 371.  Green, supra note 367. 
 372.  E.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Opposes Alaska Proposal to Allow 
Physician Collective Bargaining (Jan. 31, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/2002/01/ftc-staff-opposes-alaska-proposal-allow-physician-collective; Press Release, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Opposes Washington State Proposal to Allow Physician Collective Bar-
gaining (Feb. 14, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/02/ftc-staff-op-
poses-washington-state-proposal-allow-physician. 
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FTC filed a brief that, while formally about the scope of the state action doc-
trine,373 attacked the City of Seattle’s ordinance granting collective bargain-
ing rights to Uber and other cab drivers.374  In 2008, the FTC wrote a letter 
to an Indiana legislator regarding a bill to grant collective bargaining rights 
to home health workers.375  Home care providers offer critical care to the ill 
and are disproportionately women of color and notoriously underpaid and 
overworked.376  In an article on this important and exploited group of work-
ers, Vann R. Newkirk II, a staff writer at The Atlantic, described their plight: 
Home-care workers are not . . . afforded wages or protections com-
mensurate with their importance, with over a quarter living under 
the poverty line and more than half reliant on public assistance.  
That economic vulnerability is especially notable because of just 
who tends to work in home care: Women of color are the largest 
demographic group within the home-care workforce.  Their vul-
nerability reflects a long history of exploitation of women of color 
working in-home jobs, and highlights a growing inequality in the 
health-care workforce, even as health coverage expands to more 
and more Americans.377 
Notwithstanding these economic and social realities, the FTC expressed op-
position to the Ohio bill on competition policy grounds and stated that the 
proposed collective bargaining rights could violate federal antitrust law.378 
                                                          
 373.  Brief for the United States & Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant 
& in Favor of Reversal, Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 
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 374.  Marshall Steinbaum, The Feds Side Against Alt-Labor, ROOSEVELT INST.: NEXT NEW 
DEAL (Nov. 16, 2017), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/feds-side-against-alt-labor/. 
 375.  Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen et al., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to William J. Seitz, Ohio 
Senate 4–5 (Feb. 14, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_docu-
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 376.  Vann R. Newkirk II, The Forgotten Providers, ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2016), 
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negotiate collectively with private health insurers.  E.g., Hearing on H.R. 1946 Before the Subcomm. 
on Intellectual Prop., Competition & the Internet of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 
(2012) (statement of Richard Feinstein, Dir. of the Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n), 
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2011/120329pharmacytestimony.pdf; Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care Industry: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. (2010) (statement of Richard Feinstein, Dir. of the Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade 
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healthcare.pdf; The Importance of Competition and Antitrust Enforcement to Lower-Cost, Higher-
Quality Health Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety & Ins. of the 
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 11th Cong. (2009) (statement of Richard Feinstein, Dir. of 
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The antitrust agencies, especially the FTC, also devoted considerable 
advocacy resources against occupational licensing regulations at the state and 
local level.  According to a former FTC official, the agency submitted “hun-
dreds of comments and amicus curiae briefs” on occupational licensing issues 
to state and local governmental bodies from the 1970s to the present day.379  
In its general competition advocacy, the FTC subscribes to questionable or 
false assumptions about the state, markets, and antitrust law.380  Among these 
assumptions, the FTC supposes that markets exist apart from and pre-exist 
the state—rather than arise from extensive state action.381  In its advocacy 
concerning occupational licensing, the FTC has treated occupational licens-
ing as an artificial imposition instead of as market-structuring rules akin to 
property, contract, and tort rules.382 
Licensing can protect consumer health and safety383 and also yield im-
portant benefits for workers, such as higher wages.384  The percentage of 
workers subject to licensing increased at the same time as the percentage of 
workers in a union declined.385  Although it would be mistaken to infer a 
causal connection between the two trends, these developments suggest that 
the expansion of occupational licensing may function for workers as an im-
perfect substitute to unionization.386  Licensing may also mitigate the effects 
of gender and racial discrimination in the labor market.387  In light of its im-
plication of myriad public interests, occupational licensure is an example of 
                                                          
the Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
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Office of Policy Planning, Fed. Trade Comm’n), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/pub-
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 380.  Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 951, 955–87 
(2008). 
 381.  Id. at 954.  See generally Sandeep Vaheesan & Frank Pasquale, The Politics of Profession-
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309 (2018). 
 382.  Vaheesan & Pasquale, supra note 381, at 317. 
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 385.  Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Li-
censing, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 676, 678–79 (2010). 
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 387.  Peter Q. Blair & Bobby W. Chung, Occupational Licensing Reduces Racial and Gender 
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policy that requires moral and political judgments and should not be cabined 
in a narrow technocratic frame.388 
Rather than acknowledging the nuances of licensing, the FTC adopts an 
almost categorical position, treating licensing as a general economic menace 
and calling on states to evaluate licensing rules solely through the prism of 
consumer welfare and consumer protection.389  To be sure, occupational li-
censing today is not perfect nor above criticism.  It should be subject to care-
ful examination and reformed as appropriate.390  The FTC, however, defines 
the legitimate purposes of occupational regulation narrowly and appears to 
believe that the appropriate scope of democratic policymaking is limited.  In 
a letter exemplifying this economistic ideology, the FTC wrote to a Chicago 
alderman concerning a taxicab regulation under consideration in the city that 
“[a]ny restrictions on competition that are implemented should be no broader 
than necessary to address legitimate subjects of regulation, such as safety and 
consumer protection, and narrowly crafted to minimize any potential anti-
competitive impact.”391 
IV.  HOW REMAKING ANTITRUST LAW COULD HELP END THE NEW GILDED 
AGE 
Congress, the antitrust agencies, and federal courts should restore the 
original anti-monopoly, pro-worker vision for the antitrust laws.  For much 
of their history, these laws had a pro-capital, anti-worker orientation.  Not-
withstanding this record, these laws can be reoriented to police capital and 
accommodate labor in accord with the intent of Congress.  In passing these 
laws, Congress aimed to curtail the power of capital and also preserve space 
for workers to organize.392  The antitrust agencies and federal courts should 
                                                          
 388.  See RAHMAN, supra note 40, at 99 (“The analysis of complex multifaceted problems nec-
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 391.  Letter from Andrew I. Gavil et al., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Brendan Reilly, Chi. City Coun-
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 392.  See supra Part I. 
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reject the ahistorical and deficient efficiency paradigm and embrace the po-
litical economy framework of the sponsors of the antitrust laws.  Specifically, 
they need to reinterpret antitrust to restore competitive market structures and 
limit the power of large businesses over consumers, producers, rivals, and 
citizens.  Along with imposing checks on the power of large businesses, Con-
gress, the agencies, and the courts must preserve freedom of action for work-
ers acting in concert. 
New statutes and executive and judicial reinterpretation of antitrust law, 
in accord with congressional intent, would help remedy many economic and 
political injustices in the United States today.  Monopoly and oligopoly ap-
pear to contribute to a host of societal ills.  These include increased inequal-
ity,393 diminished income for workers394 and other producers,395 and declin-
ing business formation.396  At the same time, protecting workers’ collective 
action against antitrust challenges would create more space for workers to 
organize and claim a fairer share of income and wealth.397  Restoring antitrust 
law to its original goals would likely produce a more just and equitable soci-
ety.  Although no means a panacea for what ails the United States, antitrust 
law should be part of a broader social democratic agenda that reduces the 
yawning inequalities in wealth and power today.398 
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Reinterpreting and reviving antitrust law will require new legislation 
from Congress,399 a radical remaking of the federal antitrust agencies and the 
courts, or some combination of both.  Congress, the DOJ, the FTC, and the 
courts would have to undo a thick accretion of pro-business, anti-worker case 
law and guidelines.400  The current Supreme Court and the Trump admin-
istration are, if anything, likely to entrench the consumer welfare antitrust 
that failed consumers and workers, to continue to tolerate the abuses of mo-
nopolies and monopsonies, and to deploy antitrust against the powerless.401  
Yet, administrations and the composition of the Supreme Court are not des-
tined to remain the same. 
Already signs of progress are clear.  Along with bills on strengthening 
antitrust in Congress, a number of members of Congress and candidates for 
Congress are making antitrust a centerpiece of their agenda.402  At least on 
the Democratic side, antitrust and anti-monopoly appear likely to be im-
portant themes in the contest to be the party’s presidential nominee in 2020.  
And if and when an administration committed to the revival of antitrust and 
control of corporate power is elected, it would have an opportunity to pursue 
a different course on antitrust through both appointments to the federal anti-
trust agencies and to the judiciary.  In relying on the executive branch and 
the courts, the conservative reinterpretation—and retrenchment—of antitrust 
                                                          
 399.  See Chuck Schumer, A Better Deal for American Workers, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2017), 
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to Modernize Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/in-
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 400.  See supra Part III. 
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vanaugh; Sandeep Vaheesan, Neil Gorsuch’s Alarming Views on Antitrust and Monopoly, WASH. 
MONTHLY (Mar. 17, 2017), http://washingtonmonthly.com/2017/03/17/neil-gorsuchs-alarming-
views-on-antitrust-and-monopoly/; Cecilia Kang, How Trump’s Pick for Top Antitrust Cop May 
Shape Competition, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/technol-
ogy/how-trumps-pick-for-top-antitrust-cop-may-shape-competition.html/; Brian Fung, Trump 
Names Maureen Ohlhausen as Acting FTC Chairwoman, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/01/25/trump-names-maureen-ohlhau-
sen-as-acting-ftc-chairwoman/?utm_term=.46441ca17764. 
 402.  E.g., Senator Elizabeth Warren, Keynote Remarks at New America’s Open Markets Pro-
gram Event: Reigniting Competition in the American Economy (June 29, 2016), http://www.war-
ren.senate.gov/files/documents/2016-6-29_Warren_Antitrust_Speech.pdf; Matthew Yglesias, 
Booker Calls on Antitrust Regulators to Start Paying Attention to Workers, VOX (Nov. 1, 2017), 
http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/11/1/16571992/booker-antitrust-letter; David 
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offers one model for reviving the field.403  And even in the near term, litiga-
tion can yield important advances.  Some lower courts appear receptive to 
reinvigorating or at least honoring mid-century precedents the Supreme 
Court has not overruled.404 
A.  Confronting the Power of Capital 
A reinterpretation of the antitrust laws needs to be founded on the polit-
ical economy embodied in the legislative histories of the principal antitrust 
laws.  The Congresses that enacted these statutes were not concerned with 
narrow economics or some abstract notion of competition. Instead, they 
sought to control the power of the new monopolies and trusts that dominated 
the American political economy.  They had a broad conception of the power 
of large-scale enterprise and considered—and condemned—the trusts’ power 
over consumers, producers, competitors, and citizens.405  A review of the leg-
islative histories reveals economic and political ideas that are consonant with 
popular concerns about corporate power today.406 
Permissive merger and monopoly policy resulted in a highly concen-
trated industrial structure.407  Numerous sectors across the economy became 
                                                          
 403.  Consider the conservative Supreme Court’s weakening of antitrust precedent on vertical 
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dermined the effectiveness of the long-standing per se rule against resale price maintenance in Mon-
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 404.  See, e.g., FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 347–48 (3d Cir. 2016) (cit-
ing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, and FTC v. 
Procter & Gamble for the proposition that the Supreme Court has not adopted an efficiencies de-
fense for otherwise illegal mergers and that Congress supported decentralized market structure even 
at the cost of some merger-related efficiencies).  Nonetheless, the antitrust agencies in their guide-
lines have recognized an efficiencies defense.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
supra note 20, § 10 (“[A] primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate 
significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which 
may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.  For example, 
merger-generated efficiencies may enhance competition by permitting two ineffective competitors 
to form a more effective competitor, e.g., by combining complementary assets.”). 
 405.  See supra Section I.A. 
 406.  See, e.g., Ryan Cooper, Google Is a Monopoly—and It’s Crushing the Internet, WEEK 
(Apr. 21, 2017), http://theweek.com/articles/693488/google-monopoly—crushing-internet; Lina M. 
Khan, Amazon Bites Off Even More Monopoly Power, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/06/21/opinion/amazon-whole-foods-jeff-bezos.html. 
 407.  COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF MARKET 
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more concentrated over the past two decades.408  A few examples are illus-
trative.  In the airline industry, the number of major carriers declined from 
nine to four since 2005.409  Two duopolies dominate railroads—one east of 
the Mississippi and one west of it.410  The wireless industry has four major 
players,411 with AT&T and Verizon accounting for approximately seventy 
percent of market share by revenue.412  In agriculture, concentration in-
creased dramatically in markets throughout the supply chain, starting with 
inputs such as fertilizer and seeds through processing of farmers’ crops, live-
stock, and poultry and food retailing.413  Most local labor markets in the 
United States, and in rural areas in particular, are highly concentrated (as de-
fined by the Horizontal Merger Guidelines)414 and have become more con-
centrated since the 1970s.415 
Consumer welfare antitrust failed even on consumer welfare grounds.  
In metropolitan areas across the country, hospital mergers created highly con-
centrated markets for hospital services and contributed to higher costs in 
health care.416  John Kwoka has shown that the antitrust agencies often failed 
to challenge mergers that had subsequent anticompetitive effects (higher 
short-term consumer prices).417  Furthermore, Kwoka found that merger rem-
edies, especially behavioral remedies, often failed to preserve competition.418  
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baum.pdf; Efraim Benmelech et al., Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer 
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Other research has also shown that increased market concentration contrib-
utes to higher consumer prices.419 
The failures of consumer welfare antitrust become even clearer when a 
broader set of economic and political interests are examined.  Higher con-
sumer prices are one manifestation of business power but only one and argu-
ably not the most important one.  Concentration in labor and product markets 
contributes to lower wages.420  Just from a consumer angle, dominant online 
platforms, with their huge troves of user data and lack of effective competi-
tion, pose serious threats to personal privacy.421  Companies that control in-
frastructure that support a range of activity, whether they are the electric grid 
or a search engine monopoly, have the power to shape large swaths of the 
economy over time.422   
The economic power of large business can also translate into great po-
litical power.423  Empirical research found that big business exercises dispro-
portionate influence over the political system.424  John Browne, the former 
CEO of oil and gas giant BP, explained the nexus between economic power 
and political power.  In an interview with The Wall Street Journal in 2003, 
he described how BP’s size gives it political power: 
We do get the seat at the table because of our scope and scale.  
Whether we are the second or the third largest (oil) company is of 
very little import, but we’re certainly up there and we operate in 
places which are important to the United States government, and 
the United States government is important to us. . . .  We have large 
numbers of employees in the United States.  That’s very important 
in a political system.  And they are highly concentrated.  So we 
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have a very significant presence in Texas, Illinois, Alaska, Califor-
nia.  These are important because our employees are voters.425 
Economic power extends beyond influence over politicians, regulators, 
and other public officials.  Comcast and Google illustrate this hegemonic 
power.  These giants use their power and wealth to shape the terms of debate 
through financial support for academics and non-profit organizations, includ-
ing organizations with otherwise progressive reputations.426  In their funding 
of academics and think tanks, these companies are representative of large-
scale capital, rather than outliers.  Large businesses outside telecommunica-
tions and technology also use their wealth and power to manipulate the pa-
rameters of public discussion,427 including by attempting to discipline critical 
voices.428 
Current legal standards fail to provide a check on the prerogatives of 
large businesses and do not even protect consumers from the burden of mo-
nopoly and oligopoly.  Antitrust legal standards, such as the rule of reason 
and the analytically comparable Horizontal Merger Guidelines, impose on-
erous burdens on plaintiffs challenging anticompetitive conduct and call for 
complicated, speculative inquiries into whether a business practice or merger 
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led to or will likely lead to consumer harm in the near term.429  These stand-
ards ensure plaintiffs rarely win and help protect monopolistic and oligopo-
listic domination of markets.430  Largely quantitative analysis, likely defec-
tive even for the consumer welfare standard,431 cannot do justice to the 
qualitative manifestations of business power identified in the legislative his-
tories of the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts.432  These standards cannot 
protect the open markets or the American political system from private busi-
ness power.  And these standards, by elevating complexity over simplicity, 
favor well-heeled interests who can afford to retain the most expensive law-
yers and consultants—the monopolies and oligopolies themselves.433 
To limit the power of large corporations, Congress, the antitrust agen-
cies, and the courts must embrace clear rules and presumptions and reject the 
prevailing rule of reason approach.  The Supreme Court once recognized the 
importance of rules in antitrust law and the unworkability of complicated 
standards.434  For antitrust enforcement to be effective and efficient, per se 
rules and presumptions of illegality must become the default in antitrust 
law.435  At present, rules are the norm only for price fixing and similar forms 
of horizontal collusion.436  Per se rules or presumptions of illegality should 
govern a range of conduct that threatens structurally competitive markets.  
Conduct that carries this competitive threat includes horizontal and vertical 
mergers in concentrated markets and predatory pricing, exclusive dealing, 
and tying by monopolists and near-monopolists.  Under these presumptions, 
certain firm conduct would be illegal unless the business could present cred-
ible business justifications. 
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B.  Recognizing Labor Is Not Just Another Commodity 
The antitrust laws also need to be reinterpreted to preserve the rights of 
workers to engage in collective action.  The present interpretation of the stat-
utory exemption is far too narrow and only protects workers with employee 
status under federal law.437  Workers of all types face serious obstacles when 
they seek to establish a collective voice by forming a union.  For workers 
without employee status under federal law, they face the additional threat of 
antitrust liability.  Even as antitrust law permits monopolies and oligopolies 
to dominate the economy, it is used to thwart the efforts of many American 
workers to build countervailing power.  In contrast to present administration 
and interpretation of the antitrust laws, the Congresses that passed both the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts sought to protect workers from antitrust attacks.  
The sponsors of these statutes viewed the new laws and labor organizing as 
complements in challenging and controlling the power of large-scale busi-
nesses.  They made clear distinctions between capital and labor and did not 
conceive of the antitrust laws as prescriptions for maximizing competition 
categorically across American society.  In their approach toward labor, the 
framers of the antitrust statutes wanted workers to have the freedom to act in 
a collective capacity.438 
The present, restrictive interpretation of the statutory antitrust exemp-
tion creates a significant legal threat to the organizing efforts of a large frac-
tion of workers.  While the exemption protects workers who are employees 
under federal labor law, it does not protect workers without employee status 
under federal labor law—workers classified as independent contractors may 
face antitrust liability for engaging in collective action.439  Given that nearly 
nine percent of workers are now classified or misclassified as independent 
contractors,440 this threat is not merely an academic one.  Antitrust law may 
help deter millions of workers from organizing for higher wages and better 
working conditions.  The rise of precarious employment arrangements could 
arguably make these “alt-labor” organizing activities as important as tradi-
tional labor organizing in the coming years.441  A critical segment of labor 
organizing is now focused on workers outside of conventional employee-em-
ployer relationships.442 
                                                          
 437.  L.A. Meat & Provisions Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 104 (1962). 
 438.  See supra Section I.B. 
 439.  Paul, supra note 338, at 981.  E.g., Spence v. Se. Alaska Pilots’ Ass’n, 789 F. Supp. 1007, 
1013 (D. Alaska 1990) (holding that marine pilots are not “employees” and, therefore, not entitled 
to antitrust exemption). 
 440.  Katz & Krueger, supra note 340, at 8. 
 441.  Josh Eidelson, Alt-Labor, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 29, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/alt-
labor. 
 442.  See Michael M. Oswalt, The Right to Improvise in Low-Wage Work, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 
959, 983–86 (2017). 
 
2019] ACCOMMODATING CAPITAL AND POLICING LABOR 825 
Congress or the Supreme Court should revisit the statutory exemption 
and extend it to cover not just workers in traditional employee-employer ar-
rangements but workers of all types.443  Workers, regardless of formal legal 
label and unlike capitalists, face “[p]ressures of economic necessity to work 
in order to provide for one’s family and to accommodate the needs of the 
person who is paying for the services are applicable to every person engaged 
in a trade, calling or profession.”444  They “must work to support themselves 
and their families and must make themselves available to render services at 
such times as they are needed.”445  It is long past due for the federal antitrust 
agencies and the courts to recognize the qualitative difference between home 
health care workers banding together to demand a living wage and corporate 
mergers that seek to enhance market control and bolster profits.  All those 
who labor for a living should be entitled to the antitrust exemption, not only 
those workers who are “employees” under federal law.446 
While congressional or judicial expansion of the labor exemption may 
not happen in the near term, the federal antitrust agencies, in the meantime, 
should reconsider their current enforcement priorities.  They should stop in-
vestigating the concerted activity of workers, professionals, and other small 
players and bringing enforcement actions against them.  This proposition 
should not be controversial.  At a time of agency budget cuts447 and monop-
olies and oligopolies in a number of sectors,448 the antitrust agencies cannot 
justify using public money to bring enforcement actions against music teach-
ers and organists.  Even under the existing antitrust paradigm centered on 
consumer welfare, the music teachers’ restrictive code of ethics does not 
seem like a major threat to consumer interests.449  Assuming that preserving 
low consumer prices in the short run is the exclusive or primary goal of anti-
trust law, limits on price competition between music teachers appears incon-
sequential in the larger universe of anticompetitive conduct. 
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The agencies should also reevaluate their competition advocacy priori-
ties and terminate their advocacy against occupational licensing.  The present 
focus on occupational licensing is misguided. While hardly perfect or im-
mune from criticism, occupational licensing can have myriad benefits.  Oc-
cupational licensing rules can protect consumer health and safety and also 
raise the wages of workers.450  In insisting on analyzing occupational licens-
ing through the lens of consumer welfare, the FTC acknowledged only the 
protection of consumers.  It ignored the other policy goals frequently animat-
ing licensing statutes and regulations.  Incredibly, the FTC has not merely 
offered a consumer welfare angle on these regulations; it has deemed consid-
erations besides the protection of consumer interests to be illegitimate.451  
Given the forty-year stagnation in wages for ordinary Americans,452 the 
FTC’s monomaniacal fixation on (short-term) consumer interests and dis-
missiveness toward the welfare of workers is untenable.  In attacking occu-
pational licensing, the FTC strayed far outside its purview and demanded that 
states and municipalities conform to its narrow ideology.  While the FTC is 
chasing the phantom menace of a “guilded” age, it may actually be promoting 
a new Gilded Age.453 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In enacting the principal antitrust laws, Congress aimed to curtail the 
power of large-scale capital and also protect labor unions from federal inter-
ference.  The framers of the antitrust laws understood corporate power 
broadly.  These representatives and senators were not concerned with just 
one manifestation of this power, such as higher prices for consumers; they 
sought to protect Americans in their capacity as consumers, producers, busi-
nesses, and citizens from the power of the monopolies and trusts.  Notwith-
standing their great promise, the antitrust laws have a mixed record.  At times, 
the antitrust laws have been applied to control corporate consolidation and 
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even break up durable monopolies.  For much of the mid-twentieth century, 
the antitrust laws served as a powerful check on mergers and monopolies.  At 
other periods in their history though, the antitrust laws failed to check the 
growth of corporate power and instead were used to thwart collective action 
by workers.  In the first Gilded Age and the new Gilded Age in which we 
live, the antitrust laws have generally respected the prerogatives of monopo-
listic and oligopolistic businesses and often curtailed the liberty of workers. 
Despite their recent history, the antitrust laws can play an important role 
in addressing the staggering inequality in American society today.  These 
laws can and should be reinterpreted to curtail the power of capital and pre-
serve the freedom of workers to act collectively.  Strong federal checks are 
necessary to maintain and restore competitive market structures and protect 
Americans from corporate domination of markets, politics, and society.  So 
long as Congress, the federal antitrust agencies, and the courts acquiesce to 
or follow the antitrust status quo, they will accept and enable the supremacy 
of concentrated capital and also subvert the efforts of workers to build coun-
tervailing economic and political power.  The history of antitrust law, how-
ever, shows that an animating vision and determined political action can re-
store “the Magna Carta of free enterprise”454 and redistribute power and 
wealth from the “economic royalists”455 to ordinary Americans. 
                                                          
 454.  United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 455.  Acceptance of the Renomination for the Presidency, 5 PUB. PAPERS & ADDRESSES OF 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 234 (June 27, 1936). 
